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DISCRIMINATION AFTER DEATH
MARK E. WOJCIK*

It took 26 phone calls to 26 different funeral directors before we
finally found one who was willing to take our baby and bury her.

We were given all kinds of stories. They would not embalm her. They
would take her only to the crematorium. It would have to be a closed
casket; there would be no viewing. I even had one who told me that he
would not accept her because we had her at home, and we would not
properly bag her to protect his employees.
One who was willing to take her wanted an extra $500 because of
her diagnosis and told us if we wanted an autopsy, it would be
significantly higher.
It was horrible. We hadfought that kind of discriminationwhile she
was alive, and I did not expect to face that kind of discrimination at
death, too.'

L Introduction

People of all ages, races, and religions may fall victim to discrimination at some
point in their lives. People with disabilities, women, and sexual preference
minorities also have had to develop mechanisms to cope with a lifetime of
discrimination. A number of federal, state, and local anti-discrimination laws exist

* Assistant Professor of Law, The John Marshall Law School, Chicago. An earlier version of this
article waspresented at the 21st Annual Health Law Teachers Conference of the American Society of
Law, Medicine and Ethics and the Law-Medicine Center at Case Western Reserve University School of
Law, June 9, 2000, in Cleveland, Ohio. This article updates and expands my earlier work and advocacy
to combat AIDS discrimination by funeral homes. See, e.g., Mark E. Wojcik, Prohibiting AIDS
Discriminationby FuneralHomes, in TENTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENcE ON AIDS: ABsrRAcr BOOK
VOLUmE 1, No. 210D (Yokohama, Japan Aug. 9, 1994); Mark E. Wojcik, AIDS and Funeral Homes:
Common Legal Issues Facing FuneralHome Directors,27 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 411 (1994); Mark E.
Wojcik & David Austin, Education and Advocacy to Bury AIDS Discrimination, 3 INDIAN LAW
INsTriurE, AIDS - LAw AND HUMANrrY 66 (New Delhi, India 1995). For special research assistance,
I am especially indebted to David Austin, Patrick Levy, Ricardo Schneider, and Matthew B. Walker. For
financial support for this article and for participation in the Health Law Teachers' Conference, I thank
Dean R. Gilbert Johnston and Associate Dean John Corkery of The John Marshall Law School. For other
support and assistance, I thank the AIDS Legal Council of Chicago, the Funeral Directors Service
Association of Greater Chicago, and the Indian Law Institute.
1. Americans With DisabilitiesAct of 1989: Hearingson S. 933 Before the Senate Comm. on Labor
and Human Resources and the Subcomm. on the Handicapped, 101st Cong. 102-03 (1989) (statement
of Betty and Emory Corey) [hereinafter Americans With DisabilitiesAct of 1989: Hearingson S. 933].
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to combat and prevent various acts of discrimination in matters such as housing,
employment, and access to public accommodations, such as health care facilities.
While most acts of discrimination target the living, discrimination may also occur
in the context of a funeral or burial Hate and fear do not die simply because the
target of discrimination has passed on; as long as those who discriminate continue
living, so too does the potential for acts of prejudice. In the context of a funeral or
burial, discrimination may arise against .aperson who died of AIDS-related causes
or against surviving family members and others who may be presumed to carry the
virus. While there are many legal protections available for the living, the law
generally classifies dead bodies as "objects rather than the subjects of rights."'
Can the anti-discrimination laws that protect living persons be invoked if the act
of discrimination arises in the context of a funeral or burial? If these laws can be
invoked, who would have standing to do so? If these laws are invoked, what legal
or equitable remedies might be appropriate to compensate for the injury? Is the
emotional strain upon survivors too great and the prospects of meaningful recovery
too limited to make litigation a viable option for individual plaintiffs? As a matter
of preserving human dignity, how should we identify and prevent acts of
discrimination that target those who are no longer alive?
This article examines the topic of discrimination after death in the specific
context of funerals and burials for persons who have died of causes related to HIV
or AIDS.4 This article concludes that existing anti-discrimination laws should be
applied to combat AIDS discrimination after death, that other legal remedies may
also be invoked to combat and prevent instances of AIDS discrimination by funeral
homes, and that one of the most effective means of preventing acts of discrimination
is to educate funeral home directors and the public about what the law requires.'

2. See Mark E. Wojcik & David Austin, Education and Advocacy to Bury AIDS Discrimination, 3
INDIAN LAW INsTrrtfl, AIDS - LAw AND HUMANrrY 66, 66 (New Delhi, India 1995).
3. Philippe Ducor, The Legal Statusof Human Materials,44 DRAKE L. REV. 195,212 (1996) (citing
article 31 of the Swiss Civil Code).
4. Strictly speaking, persons do not die of AIDS or HIV infection, but from the various opportunistic
infections and diseases that may appear when the immune system has been damaged. However, people
with HIV can also die of a wide variety of causes unrelated to AIDS or HIV. For example, an HIVpositive person could be killed in an auto accident, an avalanche, or be electrocuted in a bathtub. The
issues that a funeral home director would have to face would be the same. The issues arise whenever
a funeral home professional is faced with the "problem" of dealing with someone known to have the
virus. It does not make a difference whether that person, known to have HIV, does in fact die of an
AIDS-related cause or another cause.
5. Many funeral directors and embalmers have seemed to be oblivious to the potential legal
liabilities they may face if they discriminate against a person who died of an illness related to HIV. See
Mark E. Wojcik, AIDS and FuneralHomes: Common Legal Issues Facing FuneralHome Directors, 27
J. MARSHALL L. REV. 411, 411 (1994). As trained professionals, however, funeral directors and
embalmers will usually comply with the law when they know what that law is and what it requires of
them.
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II. Background
A. HIV and AIDS
In 1981, the Centers for Disease Control of the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services (now known as the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention)
(CDC)6 began tracking deaths from mysterious causes that would later be linked to
HIV. 7 By the end of the twentieth century, a disease entirely unknown to science

just two decades earlier had claimed the lives of an estimated 18.8 million people:
7.3 million men, 7.7 million women, and 3.8 million children under the age of
fifteen.' The disease struck every comer of the globe with devastating fury, killing
the 18.8 million people already mentioned and infecting another estimated 33.6
million peopie: 17.6 million men, 14.8 million women, and 1.2 million children
under the age of fifteen.9 The disease is not going to disappear. Of those infected,

5.6 million were estimated to have been newly infected in 1999: 2.7 million men,
2.3 million women, and 570,000 children under the age of fifteen. 0 The statistics - staggering as they are - may not reflect the true number of cases."
2
Neither can those statistics reflect the full scope of the human tragedy of AIDS,
4
3
its direct and indirect economic costs, or the myriad of legal issues that have

arisen since the start of the pandemic. 5

6. Professor Thomas Philipson and Judge Richard Posner correctly noted that the new name is
redundant and unfamiliar. See THOMAs J. PHIUPSON & RICHARD A. POSNER, PRIVATE CHOICES AND
PUBLIC HEALTH: THE AIDS EPIDEMIC IN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 11 n.8 (1993).
7. Although the first reports of the disease that would later be called AIDS appeared in the
Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report in 1981, one group of scientists has now traced the origins of

the AIDS pandemic to the 1930s. See Lawrence K. Altman, AIDS Virus Originated Around 1930, Study
Says, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2,2000, at A15.

8. See UNAIDS, Report on the Global HIVIAIDS Epidemic - June 2000 (visited Nov. 13, 2000)
<http://www.unaids.or,/epidemi_.update/report/Epi-report_chap-glo-estim.htin>.
9. See id.
10. See idL; see also, e.g., Lawrence K. Altman, More African Women Have AIDS Than Men, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 24, 1999, at A10; Michael Wines, Needle Use Sets Off H.LV. Explosion in Russia, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 24, 1999, at A10.
11. See, e.g., Kai Wright, Statistically Insignificant: Global AIDS Figures Don't Tell the Whole
Story, WASHINGTON BLADE, Jan. 22, 1999, at 1, 10.
12. See, e.g., Patrick Cole, Illiteracy, AIDS Continue to Plague Woman Worldwide, UN Report Says,
CHI.TRIB., June 1, 2000, § 1, at 5; Louis Weisberg, Book Looks at AIDS in the Heartland,CHICAGO
FREE PRESS, June 14, 2000, at 24.

13. See, e.g., Gary Barlow, Senate Passes Ryan White CARE Act by Unanimous Vote, WINDY CrrY
TIMES (Chicago), June 15, 2000, at 6 (noting approval of $1.595 billion for fiscal year 2000 under the
CARE Act); Louis Weisberg, U.S. Senate Reauthorizes Ryan White CARE Act, CHICAGO FREE PRESS,
June 14, 2000, at 30.

14. See, e.g., Elizabeth Olson, U.N. Agency Sees AIDS Depleting the African Work Force, N.Y.
TIMES, June 13, 2000, at C4.

15. HIV disease is a global epidemic, or "pandemic." AIDS affects issues of discrimination, criminal
law, prison administration, civil liability, public health, employment law, employee benefits, family law,
immigration and travel, insurance and government benefits programs, privacy, education, and a host of
other issues. See, e.g., AMERICAN BAR ASS'N AIDS COORDINATING COMM., PERSPECTIVES ON
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Although there have been tremendous advances in the development and marketing

of protease inhibitors and other antiretroviral therapies that have decreased the death
rates in many industrialized nations," those drugs are neither universally available

nor universally effective. 7 Indeed, there have already been documented cases of

transmission of new forms of HIV that are resistant to the therapies entirely."
AIDS remains fatal, killing more people worldwide than any other infectious
disease. 9 Because of the large numbers of persons infected with HIV, funeral

homes around the world must plan for the inevitable case of handling someone who
dies of an illness related to AIDS
B. Right to a Decent Burial

"[I]n recognition of the universal sentiment of mankind, the right to decent burial
is well guarded by the law, and relatives of the deceased may insist upon legal

RETURNING TO WORK: CHANGE LEGAL ISSUES INTHE HIV/AIDS EPIDEMIC (Mark E. Rust, ed., 2000);
Michael L. Closen & Mark E. Wojik, Living With HIV and Without Discrimination,in INTERNATIONAL
LAw AND AIDS: INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES, CURRENT ISSUES, AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 151
(Lawrence Gostin & Lane Porter eds., 1992); David W. Webber, HIV and Public Health Law, in AIDS
AND THE LAW 49 (David W. Webber ed., 3d ed. 1997); Mark E. Wojcik, Global Aspects of AIDS, in
AIDS AND TE LAw, supra; Michael L. Closen et al., AIDS: Testing Democracy - IrrationalResponses

to the Public Health Crisisand the Needfor Privacyin Serologic Testing, 19 J.MARSHALL L. REV. 835
(1986); Joseph Kelly, 7he Liabilityof Blood Banks and Manufacturersof Clotting Productsto Recipients
ofHIV Infected blood, 27 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 465 (1994); Jane D. Oswald et al., AIDS: Coping with
HIVon Campus, 27 J. MARSHALL L REv. 449 (1994); Jean R. Stenlight, MandatoryNon-Anonymous

Testing ofNewborns for HIV, 27 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 373 (1994); J. Kelly Strader, Criminalizationas
a Policy Response to a Public Health Crisis, 27 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 435 (1994); Henri E. Cauvin,
South Africa in Quandary: Should Gays Donate Blood?, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2000, § 1, at N14;
American Bar Ass'n, AIDS Coordinating Comm., HIV/AIDS and the Law: An Agenda for Beyond the
Millennium (visited Nov. 14, 2000) <http.//www.abanet.org/irr/aidsproject/home.htl>.

16. See, e.g., Roger Detels et al., Effectiveness of Potent Antiretroviral Therapy on Time to AIDS
and Deathin Men With Known HIV Infection Duration,280 JAMA 1497 (1998); Stephanie H.Michaels
et al., Declining Morbidity and Mortality Among Patients with Advanced Human Immunodeficiency Virus
Infection, 339 NEw ENG. J. MED. 405 (1998); Bruce Jaspen, Abbott HIV Drug Drawing Praise, CHI.
TRIB., Feb. 2, 1999, § 3, at 3.

17. See, e.g., George J. Annas, Human Rights and Health - The Universal Declaration of Human
Rights at 50, 339 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1778, 1780 (1998); Mark E. Wojeik, Recent Developments in
International Health Law, 33 INT'L LAw. 617, 617-18 (1999); see also Frangoise Girard, Cairo + Five:

Reviewing Progress for Women Five Years After the International Conference on Population and
Development, 1 J. WOMEN'S HEALTH & L. 1, 12 (1999).
18. See Oren J. Cohen & Anthony S. Fauci, Transmission of Multidrug-Resistant Human
Immunodeficiency Virus - The Wake Up Call, 339 NEw ENG. J. MED.341, 342 (1998); Frederick M.
Hecht et al., Sexual Transmission of an HIV-1 Variant Resistant to Multiple Reverse-Transcriptase and
Protease Inhibitors, 339 NEw ENO. J. MED. 307 (1998); David Brown, Researchers Find HIV Strains
That Resist Most AIDS Drugs, WASH. POST, July 1, 1998, at A3.
19. See, e.g., Catherine Petitnicolas, AIDS Turns South, WORLD PRESS REV., Feb. 1999, at 12; The
Impact of HIV/AIDS on Women, Children, and Development, in 10 HIV/AIDS LEGAL LINK 10 (Sept,
1999) (Austl.).

20. See Mark E. Wojcik, AIDS and Funeral Homes: Common Legal Issues Facing Funeral Home
Directors, 27 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 411, 411 (1994).
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protection to the burial place from unnecessary disturbance or wanton violation."'"
Even in the time of Plato it was understood that everyone had the right to be buried,
unless they had been caught stealing from a temple.' The denial of a proper burial
was a serious matter and was eloquently expressed by Sophocles in the early Greek
drama, Antigone. In that play, the title character defies King Kreon, who had forbid
the burial of Antigone's brother, Polyneices. The King had ordered that Polyneices
will have no ritual, no mourners,
will be left unburied so men may see him
ripped for food by dogs and vultures.'
When Antigone is brought before King Kreon to explain why she defied his order
and buried her brother, she declares herself incapable of obeying an unjust law
prohibiting the burial:
Yes [I dared to break this law] because I did not believe
that Zeus was the one who had proclaimed it;
neither did Justice,
or the gods of the dead whom Justice lives among.
The laws they have made for men are well marked out.
I didn't suppose your decree had strength enough,
or you, who are human,
to violate the lawful traditions
the gods have not written merely, but made infallible.
These laws are not for now or for yesterday,
they are alive forever;
and no one knows when they were shown to us first.
I did not intend to pay, before the gods,
for breaking these laws
because of my fear of one man and his principles.
I was thoroughly aware I would die
before you proclaimed it [my punishment of death];
of course I would die, even if you hadn't.
Since I will die, and early, I call this profit.
Anyone who lives the troubled life I do
must benefit from death.
No, I do not suffer from the fact of death.
But if I had let my own brother stay unburied
I would have suffered all the pain I do not feel now.
And if you decide what I did was foolish,
You may be fool enough to convict me too.24

21.
22.
23.
24.

Anderson v. Acheson, 110 N.W. 335, 336 (Iowa 1907).
See generally Plato, Laws XII.
1973).
SOPHOcLES, ANTIGONE 28 (Richard Emil Braun trans.,
Id. at 39.
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Antigone recognized that her brother's right to a decent burial was one protected
by the gods. Because King Kreon attempted to deny that right, Antigone had to
defy his unjust law, even if it meant her own death.' The right to a proper burial
or cremation' is universally recognized, not only in law, but also in the religious
traditions of every faith.'
Attendant to the right to a decent burial is a duty upon the living to see that the
dead are properly buried or cremated,' or otherwise taken care of. "It has
always been recognized as one of the first duties of the living to see that the dead
are properly interred."" The right to a decent burial is a right in which both the
public and the individual have an interest." The public's interest may be
sanitary.32 The public may also have an interest in seeing the right respected
because societies may be judged by how they treat their weakest members, among
these the dying or the dead. Individuals have an interest in seeing the right
respected because a decent burial is part of our collective self-expression of values,
of feelings, of affection, of individual dignity, and of human worth."

25. See id.; see also Annas, supra note 17, at 1780; cf Acts 5:29 ("Then Peter and the other
apostles answered and said, We ought to obey God rather than men.").
26. "Cremation" is "a heating process which incinerates human remains." 16 C.F.R. § 453.1(e)
(2000). A "direct cremation" is "a disposition of human remains by cremation, without formal viewing,
visitation, or ceremony with the body present." Id. § 453.1(g).
27. Cf.JOHN BOWIcER, THE MEANINGS OF DEATH (1991); see also KATHLEEN DOWLING SINGH,
THE GRACE INDYING - How WE ARE TRANSFORMED SPIRITUALLY As WE DIE (1998).
28. See, e.g., In re Estate of Medlen, 677 N.E.2d 33, 36 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1997).
29. While a person may be normally buried or cremated, a person may donate their body "to
science." But see, e.g., Mike Doming, Body Parts Trade Faces U.S. Probe - Abuse Reports Prompt
Inquiry, CH. TRIB., June 9, 2000, § 1,at I.
30. Lay v. Lay, 255 S.W. 1054, 1055 (Ky. 1923). The sentiment that the dead must be properly
interred is also found in matters such as the continuing concern over American soldiers who were
"missing in action." For example, Captain John Dunham, who was shot down by Soviet fighters near
the Kuril Islands in 1952, was not found until only recently; his 74-year-old widow told a reporter: "It
does make a tremendous difference to finally know what happened ....I don't like the word closure,
because one never does stop caring. But it is very important to bury the dead." Alan S. Cullison, Russian
Archives Aid Those Seeking Fate of U.S. MIAs in Korea - Files Hold Photos and Detailsof Dogfights,
Wreckage in Which American Airmen Died, WALL ST.J.,
June 13, 2000, at Al, A10.
31. See, e.g., Holland v. Metalious, 198 A.2d 654, 656 (N.H. 1964); 22A AM. JUR. 2D Dead Bodies
§ 13, at 17 (1988).
32. "[C]ourts have recognized that there is a right to a decent burial, corresponding to the commonlaw right to bury one's dead in order to maintain public health and human decency." Crockett v. Stewart
Essex and Turpin Funeral Home, Inc., 19 S.W.3d 585, 589 (Ark. 2000).
33. In the context of cadavers used in anatomical study, Professor D. Gareth Jones of the
Department of Anatomy and Structural Biology at the University of Otago, New Zealand, has identified
three components of a "moral intuition" to respect the dead:
[A]n initial component is the close identification of people and their bodies. Our
recognition of each other depends upon a recognition of an array of physical characteristics which are distinctive features during life and are not extinguished immediately on
death. Hence, what is done to a dead body has relevance for our feelings about that
person when alive: the cadaver and the person cannot be totally separated.
A second component concerns other people's responses to the cadaver. Those who
knew the person when alive have memories of that person: what he or she was like, his
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C. FuneralHome Directors and Embalmers
Funeral home directors and embalmers are trained professionals who oversee the
practical aspects of an important and fundamental part of our society. Funeral home
directors are professionals who arrange all aspects of a funeral service. 4 Embalmers are often independent contractors who usually work for a number of funeral
homes. Funeral home directors and embalmers must undergo professional training
and be licensed."

Among some funeral directors there is anecdotal evidence that an independent
embalmer will be called to a funeral home only on two occasions: (1) when it is
a holiday, or (2) when the person to be embalmed died of AIDS-related causes. If
an embalmer is called in to work on a case of a person who died of AIDS-related
causes, the embalmer will, of course, charge the funeral director for providing this
service. Because this raises the cost of the funeral for a person who died of AIDS-

related causes, the Americans with Disabilities Act and perhaps other state and local
legislation may prohibit the funeral director from passing on an embalmer's fee to
the family;' the director must instead absorb that cost. 7
or her personality, attitudes, beliefs, and hobbies. In a sense, the cadaver represents an
array of built-in memories, that can never be completely separated from it. For most
people these memories lead to a sense of respect for a cadaver and its enshrined
associations. On the other hand, disrespect for a cadaver commonly evokes a sense of

revulsion.
A third component directs attention onto the deceased person's relationships; he or she
was someone's relative or friend, who is now grieving the death. Consequently, respect
for the cadaver is respect for the relatives' grief. Although the depth of the grief will
decrease as time passes, the reality of the cadaver may play a substantial role during the
grieving process.
Taken together, these components of moral intuition suggest that there are certain ways
in which cadavers are and are not [to be] treated, even if unfettered value is not bestowed
upon them.
D. GARET JONES, SPEAKING FOR THE DEAD: CADAVERS IN BIOLOGY IN MEDICINE 42 (2000).
34. Fortunately, most funeral home directors handle cases of persons who die of AIDS-related
causes with dignity and respect; those who discriminate on the basis of AIDS are in the minority. See,
e.g., Wojcik & Austin, supra note 2, at 66.
35. In Nevada, to take one example, an applicant for a license to practice embalming must have
completed at least two academic years of instruction at an accredited college or university and an
additional 12 full months of instruction in an embalming college or school of mortuary science accredited
by the Conference of Funeral Services Examining Boards of the United States. See NEV. REV. STAT. §
642.080 (2000). The applicant must also have at least one year of practical experience under the
supervision of an embalmer licensed in that state and have actually embalmed at least 50 bodies under
the supervision of that licensed embalmer. See id. Other states, such as California, require two years of
practical experience and assistance in embalming at least 100 bodies before being eligible to be licensed.
See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 7643 (West 1995); see also Beard v. State Bd. of Embalmers & Funeral
Directors, 295 P. 1052 (Cal. Ct. App. 1931) (affirming the constitutionality of certain statutory
requirements for embalmer's license). There are also professional qualifying examinations, continuing
education requirements, and other legal restrictions and requirements. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4717.04 (Anderson 1995). See generally R.P. Davis, Annotation, Validity and Constructionof Statute,
Ordinance, or Other Regulation in Relation to Funeral Directorsand Embalmers, 89 A.L.R.2D 1338
(1963).
36. See supra note I and accompanying text.

HeinOnline -- 53 Okla. L. Rev. 395 2000

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:389

Embalming is a chemical process that temporarily protects a body from decay.
When funeral homes lacked refrigeration, the corpse of the deceased was subject to

rapid decomposition. It was, therefore, necessary to embalm bodies if the family
wanted to have an open-casket viewing.38 Now, even with refrigeration in funeral
homes, embalming is generally considered to be a routine and appropriate method

of preparing a body for burial or visitation.39 Complete embalming can preserve
a body for up to thirty-five years.'

Although embalming is common,4' the law does not generally require it for
open-casket viewing - even for persons who die of causes related to HIV. In fact,
many jurisdictions expressly provide that embalming is not required, except in
certain circumstances.42 It is also a violation of federal law for a funeral home
director to tell a consumer that embalming is required, unless a state or local law
actually does mandate this procedure.43
Although funeral homes should give consumers the option of being refrigerated

rather than being embalmed, a survey of funeral homes in California found that
many funeral homes were not giving consumers this choice.' The survey also
found that many funeral homes were charging "the exact same price for refrigeration
as for embalming, although refrigeration can be a far less expensive option."5

These consumers end up paying the price for embalming, even when they do not
desire that service.

37. See T. Scott Gilligan, Are Trade EmbalmersAffected by the ADA?, DIRECTOR, Apr. 1992, at
41 (Official Publication of the National Funeral Directors Association).
38. See Emanuel Parker, 'Can You Afford to Die?'Asks Report, L.A. SmmNEL, Mar. 12, 1998, at
A3, available at 1998 WL 11413277. A body may, but need not, be embalmed for a closed-casket
funeral service.
39. See, e.g., Konecay v. Hohenschuh, 173 N.W. 901 (Iowa 1919); Sworski v. Simons, 293 N.W.
309,312 (Minn. 1940) (Holt, J., dissenting); Parker v. Quinn-McGowen Co., 138 S.E.2d 214 (N.C. 1964)
(no liability for embalming).
40. See Flores v. Baca, 871 P.2d 962, 968 (N.M. 1994) (allowing damages for breach of contract
in a claim of negligent embalming).
41. See, e.g., Clark v. Smith, 494 S.W.2d 192, 197 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973) (testimony of an
undertaker to the effect that "fa]ny dead human body needs to be embalmed").
42. For example, the relevant New Mexico statute provides that "dead human bodies not disposed
of within twenty-four hours after death shall be embalmed... or stored under refrigeration .... unless
otherwise required by regulation of the office of the medical investigator or the secretary of health or by
orders of an authorized official of the office of the medical investigator, a court of competent jurisdiction
or other authorized official." N.M. STAT. ANN. § 61-32-20(A) (Michie 1978). Subsection F of that
statute provides expressly that "[ejxcept as provided in Subsection A ...embalming is not required."
Id. § 61-32-20(F).
43. See 16 C.F.R. § 453.3(a)(1) (2000); see also Parker, supra note 38. Robert Ninker, Executive
Director of the Illinois Funeral Directors' Association, told one newspaper that he believed that "a funeral
director is within his rights to require embalming - which is not explicitly required under Illinois law if visitation is requested." John Carpenter, AIDS Cited in FuneralHome Suit - Lack of Wake Angers
Partner,CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, Nov. 23, 1996, at 2. Ninker's assertion to the newspaper, however, does
not appear to be in accord with federal law.
44. See Parker, supra note 38.
45. Id.
46. See id.
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Specific guidelines have been written for those who embalm bodies that may be
infected with HIV.' In general, when embalming the body of a person who died
of AIDS-related causes, the embalmer and any assisting personnel should be
properly garbed in suits consisting of a disposable scrub suit, a plastic apron, double
rubber gloves, shoe covering, hair covering, and a face mask.' After removing the
body from the pouch, it should be thoroughly washed with a disinfectant soap.49
Once the body is properly cleaned, the features may be set and the body embalmed
with a solution strong enough to kill any organisms that may be present. When
the job is finished, the embalmer should disinfect his instruments, the sink, the
underside of the embalming table, and the foot end of the table.' The floor should
be mopped with a strong disinfecting solution.' The embalmer should carefully
remove his suit, and place the items into a plastic bag along with the pouch and the
sheets used for removal of the body." The bag should be handled carefully to
ensure that the hands do not come into contact with any surface touched by the
contaminated materials in the bag.' The bag should be incinerated or else a
disinfecting chemical should be applied in the plastic bag, and the bag should then
be tied shut.5 The embalmer and any attendants should wash thoroughly before
changing into their regular clothing.'
The guidelines described in general terms here are essentially the "universal
precautions" set forth by the CDC. Since 1987, the CDC' has recommended that
health care workers who are exposed to bodily fluids follow universal precautions
to minimize the risk of HIV transmission 8 Funeral home personnel also are
subject to the "Bloodborne Pathogen Rule" promulgated by the Occupational Safety
and Health Administration of the U.S. Department of Labor (OSHA)." The
Bloodborne Pathogen Rule requires employers to ensure that employees follow
universal precautions when they are occupationally exposed to blood and other

47. See, e.g., Robert J. Inman, Guidelines for Embalming an AIDS Body (n.d.).
48. See id. at 2.

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

See id.
See idi at 2-3.
See id, at 3.
See i&
See id,
See id.
See id.
See id.

57. See PHILLIPSON & POSNER, supra note 6.

58. In addition to protecting against the risk of HIV transmission, use of universal precautions also
protects against the risk of transmission of hepatitis B virus and other bloodborne pathogens. See
Recommendationsfor Prevention of HIV Transmission in Health-CareSettings, 36 [No. 2S] CENTERS
FOR DISE SE CONTROL: MMWR (MoRBIDrrY & MORTALrrY WKLY. REP.) at 2S (Supp. 1987); see also

Settlement Agreement Between the United States Department of Justiceand the Vasquez FuneralHome,
No. DJ 202-23-41, available in <http:llwww.usdoj.govlcrttadalvasquez.htm> (visited Oct. 31, 2000)
[hereinafter Settlement Agreement].
59. See Occupational Safety & Health Administration 1.2(a), 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1030 (1999); see also
Settlement Agreement, supra note 58.
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potentially infectious materials." The universal precautions in the CDC guidelines
and the OSHA Bloodbome Pathogen Rule are fundamental principles of infection
control."' Essentially, the CDC and OSHA require funeral workers to wear

protective gear for embalming, without regard to whether the person is known to
have died of causes related to HIV or AIDS.' The concept of universal
precautions stresses:
[A]I1 human blood and certain bodily fluids must be assumed to be
infectious for HIV, [Hepatitis B Virus], and other bloodborne pathogens,
because persons who are exposed to blood and other potentially

infectious bodily fluids are not always in a position to know whether
such bodily fluids presently harbor or once harbored an infectious
disease.Y
Because funeral home workers should treat all bodies as having the potential to
transmit HIV or other blood-borne pathogens, they should "adhere rigorously to the
use of universal precautions" to protect themselves against these dangers.' Studies
have shown that embalmers, those who perform autopsies, and other funeral service
practitioners who follow these universal precautions face only "a low level of work-

related risk for bloodbome infections."'
D. FuneralArrangements

"There is no universal rule regarding the right of persons to bury the dead, but

each case must be considered in equity on its own merits."' The right to bury or
otherwise dispose of a corpse has been held to be a legal right that some courts may

protect as a "quasi-property" right6 Courts and legislatures generally provide that

60. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1910.1030(a), (d)(I)-(d)(4); see aLvo Settlement Agreement, supra note 58.
61. See Settlement Agreement, supra note 58.
62. See Parker, supra note 38.
63. Settlement Agreement, supra note 58.
64. Id.
65. Charles W. Henderson, OccupationalExposure Embalmers at Low Risk of Blood Infections on
Job, BLOOD WKLY., Feb. 27, 1995, available in 1995 WL 10089624 (reporting on an abstract presented
at the Second National Conference on Human Retroviruses and Related Infections); Embalmers Said
Unlikely to Get HIVDuring Procedures,AIDS POL'Y & L., Oct. 4, 1989, at 10-11 (describing low risk
of occupational exposure to HIV).
66. Estes v. Woodlawn Mem'l Park, Inc., 780 S.W.2d 759, 762 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989).
67. As the Supreme Court of Georgia explained:
In the earlier days of the common law, so Blackstone avers, no property right existed
relative to a dead body, and matters concerning corpses were left to the ecclesiastical
courts. "But though the heir has a property in the monuments and escutcheons of his
ancestors, yet he has none in their bodies or ashes; nor can he bring any civil action
against such as indecently, at least, if not impiously, violate and disturb their remains,
when dead and buried." Because there were no ecclesiastical courts in this country to
resolve matters relating to corpses, the courts conceived the notion of "quasi-property
right," when referring to the interest of relatives in the bodies of their next-of- kin. Dean
Prosser noted: "It seems reasonably obvious that such 'property' is something evolved out
of thin air to meet the occasion, and that in reality the personal feelings of the survivors
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a lawful spouse will have the primary right to control the final disposition of a
human body.' The exercise of this right is not absolute, however, and it may be
waived by consent or other circumstances,' such as an inability to locate the
lawful spouse in a timely manner.
If a person who has the right (and the duty) to arrange for the final disposition
of a body fails to exercise that right, the right (and the duty) may then pass to

another person." If the will provides for disposition of the body, the executor
named in the will may have the right (and the duty) to arrange the funeral
service.7 Similarly, an executor who does not exercise the right to arrange the
funeral may waive that right.' In some cases, the right (and the duty) may even
fall on a complete stranger, such as the owner of a house where a person dies. 3
In these circumstances, the stranger who arranged for the funeral service may seek
reimbursement for the expenses incurred.7'
Of course, persons may also arrange their own funeral and burial ahead of
time.' A number of funeral homes allow individuals to arrange their own funerals
'
by use of a "pre-pay contract."76
Planning ahead can save significant amounts of
money and grief for the survivors.' Additionally, persons facing a terminal illness
may often gain emotional comfort by having a say in the planning of their own
are being protected, under a fiction likely to deceive no one but a lawyer."
Georgia Lions Eye Bank, Inc. v. Lavant, 335 S.E.2d 127, 128 (Ga. 1985) (citing 2 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES THE LAW OF ENGLAND 429 (T. Cooley ed., 1899) and W. PAGE KEETON
ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TiE LAW OF TORTS § 12, at 63 (5th ed. 1984)); see also, e.g.,
Crockett v. Stewart Essex and Turpin Funeral Home, Inc., 19 S.W.3d 585, 589 (Ark. 2000); 25A C.J.S.
Dead Bodies § 2 (1966); John B. Winski, Note, There Are Skeletons in the Closet: The Repatriationof
Native American Human Remains and Burial Objects, 34 ARiz. L. REV. 187, 208 (1992).
68. See, e.g., Sacred Heart of Jesus Polish Nat'l Catholic Church v. Soklowski, 199 N.W. 81, 83
(Minn. 1924); Sullivan v. Catholic Cemeteries, Inc., 317 A.2d 430, 432 (R.I. 1974); 22A AM. JUR. 2D
Dead Bodies § 21 (1988).
69. See, e.g., Teasley v. Thompson, 165 S.W.2d 940, 941 (Ark. 1942); Whitehair v. Highland
Memory Gardens, Inc., 327 S.E.2d 438,443 (W. Va. 1985); 22A AM. JUR. 2D Dead Bodies § 21 (1988).
70. See, e.g., Fischer's Estate v. Fischer, 117 N.E.2d 855, 858 (Ill. App. Ct. 1954); 22A AM. JUR.
2D Dead Bodies § 15 (1988).
71. See, e.g., Lay v. Lay, 255 S.W. 1054, 1055 (Ky. 1923) (duty fell on stepson); Patterson v.
Patterson, 59 N.Y. 574, 574 (N.Y. 1875) (duty on executor); Wynkoop v. Wynkoop, 42 Pa. 293 (Pa.
1862); see also 22A AM. JUR. 2D Dead Bodies § 14, at 17 (1988); 31 AM. JUR. 2d Executors and
Administrators §§ 320-22 (1989).
72. See, e.g., Fischer'sEstate, 117 N.E.2d at 858; Spanich v. Reichelderfer, 628 N.E.2d 102, 107
(Ohio Ct. App. 1993); In re Estate of Moyer, 577 P.2d 108, 110-11 (Utah 1978); see aLo 22A AM. JUR.
20 Dead Bodies § 29 (1988).
73. See, e.g., 22A AM. JUR. 2D Dead Bodies § 18 (1988).
74. See, e.g., id.
75. See, e.g., Ducor, supranote 3, at 232; Frank D. Wagner, Annotation, Enforcement of Preference
Expressed by Decedent as to Disposition of His Body After Death, 54 A.L.R.3D 1037, 1040-41 (1974).
76. See generally 22A AM. JUR. 2D Dead Bodies § 7 (1988); Thomas G. Fischer, Annotation,
Construction and Effect of Contracts or Insurance Policies Providing Preneed Coverage of Burial
Expense or Services, 67 A.L.R.4TH 36 (1989); see also E.S. Stephens, Annotation, Validity of Statutes
Regulating Pre-Need Contractsfor the Sale or Furnishing of Burial Services and Merchandise, 68
A.L.R.2D 1251 (1959).
77. See, e.g., Parker, supranote 38.
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funeral arrangements. Involvement in the planning stages allows family and friends
the benefit of knowing the concerns that the ill person has regarding a memorial
service and final disposition of the body. It also allows them the security of
knowing that they are acting in accordance with the wishes of their loved ones. This
collaborative effort also ensures that the dying can depart with the knowledge that
their wishes will be respected.
People who have suffered the loss of a loved one operate under extreme levels
of stress. For this reason, the existence of a pre-arranged funeral or burial plan can
act as a safeguard and facilitate the emotional comfort level of survivors. If contact
with a funeral home is made only after the loved one has died, there is a greater
probability that the survivors will be disoriented and in pain. It is also more likely
that they will have to rely heavily on the advice of the funeral director in arranging
the details of the service. In these situations, survivors are much more emotionally
and financially vulnerable.
The use of a pre-need burial contract has been especially beneficial in the context
of gay and lesbian families. In cases where a gay son or lesbian daughter has been
estranged from their biological families because of their sexual orientation, that son
or daughter may generally want decisions about a funeral service to be made by a
life partner or intimate friends rather than the estranged family. In the confusion
following death, however, the family may assert contrary wishes as the "next of
kin.""8 If the individual has already made the funeral arrangements with a pre-need
contract, however, even the estranged family will generally honor those express
wishes.
III. Discussion
A. The Spectrum of Discrimination
Discrimination against persons with HIV may fall along a spectrum of
discriminatory practices by funeral homes and individuals in the funeral industry.
The most common discriminatory practices of funeral homes include direct or
indirect refusals to handle the body, assessing additional charges, and making
additional and improper demands on the conditions of service.
1. Denial of Funeral Services
At one end of the spectrum of discrimination is the direct denial of funeral
services to a person who died of AIDS-related causes. A refusal to provide services
to a person who dies of an AIDS-related illness likely arises from an unwarranted
fear of transmission of AIDS or from a concern that other customers will be
disinclined to use the services of a funeral home that caters to people with AIDS"

78. See, e.g., Stewart v. Schwartz Brothers-Jeffer Memorial Chapel, Inc., 606 N.Y.S.2d 965, 969
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1993) (dispute between surviving gay partner of a man who died of AIDS and the man's
Orthodox Jewish family was settled when the parties agreed, among other things, "to cremate Stanton's
body and split the ashes").
79. See ALAN H. TERL, AIDS AND THE LAw 127 (1992).

HeinOnline -- 53 Okla. L. Rev. 400 2000

2000]

DISCRIMINATION AFTER DEATH

The denial of services may be blatant or subtle. In the earlier years of the

epidemic, it was not uncommon for persons to go from one funeral home to another
looking for a place that would handle the funeral. One foster mother, for example,
made "26 phone calls to 26 different funeral directors before we finally found one
who was willing to take our baby and bury her. ' Even in the later years of the
epidemic, however, there are still cases that arise where a funeral home director
simply refuses to handle a person who died of causes related to AIDS."1
The complete denial of services may also be more subtle. For example, industry
employees may steer families or loved ones to another funeral home that has "more
experience" in handling persons who died of AIDS-related causes. Some funeral
homes did in fact develop more experience in handling these funerals because they
did so with respect and dignity for the person who died. Indeed, many AIDS
service organizations compiled lists of funeral homes that would handle funerals
professionally and compassionately. The lists were intended to help families and
loved ones avoid the nightmares of calling from funeral home to funeral home to
find one that would provide professional services in an atmosphere of dignity and

respect. The practice of listing friendly funeral homes may have inadvertently
fostered this form of discrimination. The lists provided funeral directors the
knowledge and opportunity to steer unwanted business to other funeral homes
without appearing to be discriminatory.

The United States has seen a drastic decline in the frequency of blatant refusals
to provide funeral services, at least in the metropolitan areas where funeral homes

80. Mrs. Betty Corey, a foster parent who cared for a child with AIDS, testified in support of the
Americans with Disabilities Act and told the incredible story of her difficulties in arranging the funeral
of that child:
About a week before Kedra died, we decided to begin making arrangements for her
funeral and burial. I was a member of the Baltimore County Task Force on AIDS, and
at one of our meetings, the president of the Funeral Directors' Association was there, and
I realized at the time we were going to face a lot of discrimination. We began to make
phone calls, and we were turned down. They either would not take her, or they would not
offer the full services they offered anyone else.
...It took 26 phone calls to 26 different funeral directors before we finally found one
who was willing to take our baby and bury her.
We were given all kinds of stories. They would not embalm her. They would take her
only to the crematorium. It would have to be a closed casket; there would be no viewing.
I even had one who told me that he would not accept her because we had her at home,
and we would not properly bag her to protect his employees.
One who was willing to take her wanted an extra $500 because of her diagnosis and
told us if we allowed an autopsy, it would be significantly higher.
It was horrible. We had fought discrimination while she was alive, and I did not expect
to face that kind of discrimination at death, too.
Americans With Disabilities Act of 1989: Hearingson S. 933, supranote 1,
at 102-03 (statement of Betty
and Emory Corey).
81. See Phil Sneiderman, FuneralDirector'sAIDS Policy Stuns Activists - His Acknowledgment
That Such Deaths are Referred to OtherMortuariesAlso Surprises Industry Leaders, L.A. TiMes, Nov.
18, 1993, at 1, available in 1993 WL 2251326.
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now have acquired considerable experience in handling AIDS cases. The more
subtle refusals still occur, but they are necessarily harder to track, as persons who
are in a state of emotional shock and distress from the loss of a loved one may
never recognize the reason they are being steered to another home or recognize that
the practice may violate federal and state law.' They may also simply decide to
find another funeral home on their own rather than to have a service at a funeral
home where they are not wanted."
In other cases, a funeral home may appear to be providing services that it may
actually not be providing. A funeral home in Pennsylvania, for example, conducted
a funeral service with an empty casket so that it would not have to handle the body
of a woman's son who had died of AIDS-related causes. A jury awarded the mother
$175,000 for the distress caused by the funeral home's deception."
Denials of funeral services continue in the United States and in many other parts
of the world, however. For example, in Australia funeral workers refused to carry
the coffin of a man who died of an AIDS-related illness. In Morocco, a doctor
refused to sign the certification required to bury a person who died of AIDS-related
causes.' In a remote town in Canada, the sole funeral director refused to embalm
a man who had died of AIDS-related causes. A funeral director in Bloomingdale,
Illinois, simply refused to handle the burial of a person who died of AIDS-related
causes,8 while a funeral director in another Chicago suburb discriminated against
a man who died of AIDS-related causes by denying a proper funeral service.
Other informal reports of discrimination recount similar acts of discrimination in
countries such as Indonesia, Japan, the Philippines, and Russia. Jews who are buried
in Israel are generally interred directly in the earth according to religious tradition
that the body be placed uncovered in the soil of the Holy Land while awaiting
ultimate resurrection; when persons die of AIDS-related causes, however, they are
wrapped in shrouds that are conspicuously labeled with markings that indicate HIV
infection." Funeral directors in Padua, Italy, even kept a separate cemetery for
persons who died of AIDS-related causes.

82. See infra notes 111-48 and accompanying text.
83. See Wojcik & Austin, supra note 2, at 69.
84. See JuryPa. Awards Woman $175,000 On Empty Casket FuneralCharges, AIDS POL'Y & L.,
Jan. 21, 1994, at 3.
85. See Helen Watchirs, HIV/AIDS Anti-Discriminationand Privacy Laws in Australia,in 3 INDIAN
LAw INSTiTuTE, AIDS - LAw AND HUMANrY 54, 60 (New Delhi, India 1995).
86. See Wojcik & Austin, supra note 2, at 68. In another case from Morocco, a rabbi in Casablanca
refused to allow the burial of a young woman who died of AIDS-related causes. See id.
87. See id. at 69. In a tremendous display of courage and love, the deceased man's brother
volunteered to embalm his own brother while the funeral director stood next to him and gave instructions
on what to do. See id.
88. See id. The family decided to seek out a new funeral home rather than challenge the denial of

service.
89. See Charge of Discrimination, John Doe v. Michael's Funeral Home, No. 1994CP3153 (III. Dep't
of Human Rights, June 20, 1994) (copy on file with the Oklahoma Law Review).
90. See Wojcik & Austin, supra note 2, at 69.
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2. Unusual Requirements
Another way funeral homes discriminate against persons who die of HIV occurs
when they make improper demands or wrongly suggest to families that persons with
HIV must be cremated or buried in a closed casket in order to avoid embalming'
Although cremation is now considered to be common, some may view it as an
unusual practice because their religious beliefs or family traditions have prohibited
this method for disposing of the body. It is discriminatory to suggest to families
that a person who died of an illness related to HIV must be cremated or that the
memorial service must be held with a closed casket by reason of decedent's cause
of death. Thousands of funerals across this country and others have proven that the
full range of options should be offered to the families.
In one case, a funeral home director in Schaumburg, Illinois, demanded that a
person who died of HIV-related causes be embalmed even for a closed casket
ceremony, although there was no such legal requirement.' Another exaniple of an
"unusual requirement" arose in New York, where one funeral home at one time
required a glass cover for the caskets of persons who died of AIDS-related
93

causes.

3. Overcharging
Other forms of discrimination against persons who die of HIV-AIDS may involve
not a denial of service, but additional charges for funeral services. In the 1980s,
some funeral homes charged an extra "handling fee" for bodies of persons who had
died of causes related to AIDS. Funeral homes continued to assess additional
charges even into the 1990s, however. One funeral home in Illinois even assessed
an extra fee for special cleaning of the hearse that carried the casket of a man who
died of AIDS-related causes. 95
Many funeral homes hire embalmers for only those cases where they know (or
suspect) that a person has died of an AIDS-related illness. Because an indepen-

91. See, e.g., Americans With DisabilitiesAct of 1989: Hearings on S. 933, supranote 1, at 102-03

(statement of Betty and Emory Corey).
92. See Charge of Discrimination, John Doe v. Michael's Funeral Home, No. 1994CP3153 (Ill. Dep't
of Human Rights, June 20, 1994) (copy on file with the Oklahoma Law Review); Wojcik & Austin, supra
note 2, at 75.
93. See DiMiceli & Sons Funeral Home v. N. Y. City Comm'n on Human Rights, 1987 WL
19527/86 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 9, 1987); Mark Barnes, Discriminationin Placesof PublicAccommodation:
Access to Health Care, Education, and Other Services, in AIDS PRACTICE MANUAL: A LEGAL AND
EDUCATIONAL GUIDE § 11.4, at 11-16 (Paul Albert et al. eds., 3d ed. 1991).
94. See, e.g., Parker, supra note 38.

95. See Charge of Discrimination, John Doe v. Michael's Funeral Home, No. 1994CP3153 (11.Dep't
of Human Rights, June 20, 1994) (copy on file with the Oklahoma Law Review); Wojcik & Austin, supra

note 2, at 75.
96. See, e.g., Funeral Services by Gregory, Inc. v. Bluefield Community Hosp. 413 S.E.2d 79, 81
(W.Va. 1991), overruled on other grounds, Courtney v. Courtney 437 S.E.2d 436 (W.Va. 1993). ("If
the family had insisted on embalming, Gregory [claims he] would have taken additional steps to
minimize his exposure, such as [by] ...sending the body to an embalming service.").
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dent embalmer will charge a fee for handling the person, the funeral director may
then attempt to pass on the extra fee as part of the total bill for the funeral
serviceY Moreover, the funeral home itself may attempt to charge extra for
alleged extra services or extra precautions!' However, additional charges to handle
cases where a person died of causes related to HIV violate anti-discrimination
laws.' Likewise, funeral directors should not charge special fees, such as a fee to
clean out hearses after the funeral of a person who died of an illness related to HIV.
This fee is particularly hard to justify as a special fee for AIDS cases because the
body does not come into direct contact with the hearse. Consequently, this
additional charge is discriminatory because it is levied only in the case where a
person died of causes related to HIV. Because the body does not come into contact
with the hearse, it makes no difference if the person died of simple pneumonia or
a pneumonia related to H1V.2"
These extra charges may be specifically prohibited under state statutes, in addition
to other applicable laws. California, for example, provides that: "No funeral director
or embalmer shall charge any additional fee for handling or embalming a body
when death was due to a contagious or infectious disease...'.. Kentucky similarly
provides that:
No embalmer or funeral director shall charge more for embalming the
remains of a person with a communicable disease which requires blood
and body fluid precautions than the price for embalming services listed
on the price list funeral providers are required to maintain and provide
to consumers pursuant to [the Federal Trade Commission's Funeral
Home Rule]."
These statutes and those from other states thus may provide an additional basis for
combating acts of discrimination.

97. See Funeral Industry Practices, 16 C.F.R. §§ 453.2(b)(4)(ii)(F), (G) (2000) (requiring disclosure
on price lists for "embalming" and "other preparation of the body"); see also id. § 453.3 (a)(2) (requiring
preventive measures against misrepresentations in embalming practices).
98. See DiMiceli & Sons Funeral Home v. New York City Comm'n on Human Rights, No.
19527/86 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 9, 1987); Barnes, supra note 93, at 11-16.
99. But see Doe v. Kahala Dental Group, 808 P.2d 1276 (Haw. 1991). The Doe case found no
violation of the Hawaii anti-discrimination law because additional precautions would be needed to treat
a dental patient with HIV. The case "ignored the CDC guidelines on universal precautions and is not in
line with current medical opinion." Kathleen M. Flaherty, Insurancefor People with AIDS Remains
ProblematicDespite ADA, 21 J.L. MED. & ETHics 397, 397 (1993).
100. Pneumocystis cariniipneumonia (PCP) was a common cause of death in the early years of the
first decade of AIDS. Aerosolized pentanidine and other medications have reduced (but not eliminated)
the incidence of PCP as a cause of death related to HIV.
101. CAL Bus. & PROF. CODE § 7685.1(c) (West 1995); see also Parker, supra note 38.
102. KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 213.076(8) (Michie 1991). The extensive federal rule on price
disclosures can be found at 16 C.F.R. § 453.2 (2000).
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B. Common Defenses
Funeral home directors may raise several defenses to charges that they
discriminated against a person who died of AIDS-related causes. To combat a
charge that they either denied services to a person who died of AIDS or simply
treated that person differently, the funeral home director may argue that AIDS is a
different type of disease that justifies different treatment. For example, Jim Mumaw,
director of the Mumaw Funeral Home in Lancaster, California, refused to provide
services to persons who died from AIDS-related causes based on his own fear of
contracting HIV. 3 Mr. Mumaw stated: "I do not wish to become one of the small
percentage of persons in my profession who will die from an accidental infection
of the HIV virus."'" An editorial in the Los Angeles Times condemned Mr.
Mumaw's refusal, noting that universal precautions allowed health care workers to
deal safely with AIDS:
Every day in this nation, doctors and nurses assistants, lab technicians, and scientists and researchers deal intimately with this disease
in an effort to find a cure, to prolong life, and to make life a little easier
for its victims. The Mumaw Funeral Home's fears do not contribute to
progress on that front. They only contribute to ignorance."
The editorial did not mention that because of the nature of their work, funeral
home workers often encounter more blood and other bodily fluids than most other
health care workers. However, the use of universal precautions will also protect
workers who are exposed to the greater quantities and varieties of these fluids. The
U.S. Department of Justice, pursuing a case against the Mumaw Funeral Home
under the Americans with Disabilities Act," reached a settlement in which Mr.
Mumaw agreed to undergo training on universal precautions to prevent the
transmission of HIV."
Another anticipated defense that a funeral home director might raise against an
allegation that it charged more to handle "an AIDS funeral" than it would have
otherwise charged for the same services, is that the funeral home actually incurred
higher costs because it used the universal precautions mandated by the CDC and
OSHA. Indeed, some funeral home associations even advised their members at one
time that they could charge an additional "contagious disease fee" for funerals where
the person died of AIDS-related causes. Universal precautions, however, are to be
used universally. A funeral home cannot chose when to use these precautions and
when to discard them, because it must treat all bodies as being potentially infected.

103. See Sneiderman, supra note 81.
104. Editorial, What Risks Does AIDS Pose to FuneralHome? Director'sPolicy Spreads Only
Ignorance of the Disease, L.A. TIMES. Nov. 21, 1993, at 14, available in 1993 WL 2250067.

105. Ma
106. See infra notes 113-28 and accompanying text.
107. See U.S. DEPTF OF JUSTICE, ENFORCEMENT HIGHTs: FIGHTING DISCRIMINATION AGAINST
PERSONS WmI HIV/AIDS (Dec. 1995), available in 1995 WL 729518.
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First, the funeral home will not always be told when a person died of AIDS. It
is true that funeral homes may expect a hospital to tell them when a person died of
AIDS-related causes; indeed, the existence of statutory exceptions from AIDS
privacy laws' has helped foster a climate where funeral home directors expect
to be told that a person died of AIDS-related causes. The funeral home may expect
to find a color-coded "toe tag" on a body that is "hot."'" A funeral home may
alternatively expect that hospital personnel, family members, or clergy will inform
them when a person died of AIDS-related causes. The funeral home may be
disappointed in these expectations, however, and should not rely upon them. Funeral
home personnel must assume that all bodies are potentially infectious and they must
use universal precautions universally. Additionally, a hospital's failure to inform a
funeral home that a person died of AIDS-related causes normally will not give rise
to a cause of action.' In fact, the hospital or family members may not even know
that a person had HIV.
C. Domestic Legal Framework
A spectrum of possible legal remedies exists to combat various forms of AIDS
discrimination by funeral homes. Some remedies are statutory rights that may be
enforced either in a federal or state court or by a federal agency; other remedies
may be common law causes of action that sound in tort or contract; and still other
remedies may involve state or local remedies that must first be brought before
specialized administrative agencies. The following discussion of the domestic legal
framework considers:
(1) federal, state, and local anti-discrimination laws;
(2) tort law;
(3) contract law;
(4) federal trade commission law;
(5) consumer protection law;
(6) criminal law;
(7) licensing laws;
(8) wills; and
(9) durable powers of attorney for health care.
These various areas present a spectrum of possible legal rights and remedies to
combat the spectrum of AIDS discrimination by funeral homes.
1. Anti-DiscriminationLaws
a) FederalAnti-DiscriminationLaw
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended,"' and the Americans with
108. See, e.g., 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/9(c) (West 1997); see also 210 ILL COMP. STAT. 85/6.08
(West 1993).
109. A statement that a body is "hot" is sometimes used to indicate that the person died of causes
related to HIV. See, e.g., Wojeik & Austin, supra note 2, at 75.
110. See, e.g., Funeral Services by Gregory, Inc. v. Bluefleld Community Hosp., 413 S.E.2d 79, 81
(W. Va. 1991), overruled on other grounds by Courtney v. Courtney, 437 S.E.2d 436 (W.Va. 1993).
111. See 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994). Inorder to fall under the amended Rehabilitation Act of 1973,
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Disabilities Act (ADA)' prohibit certain forms of discrimination against persons
who either have a disability or who are perceived as having a disability. Section
302 of title III of the ADA provides that:
No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in
the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges,
advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation
by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of
public accommodation."'

The list of places of public accommodation is broader under the ADA than under
other federal non-discrimination statutes."4 A "funeral parlor" is included in the
list of examples of "places of public accommodation" under the ADA," provided
that the funeral parlor's operations affect interstate "commerce.""..6 The requirement

stems, of course, from the federal constitution's limit on congressional power." 7
Given that the U.S. Supreme Court has now struck down two federal statutes for
failing to meet the constitutional requirement of affecting commerce,"' it may be
worthwhile for litigators to review at least some of the effects on commerce that

funeral home discrimination may have."9

the funeral home must receive federal funds. Id.
112. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994). The Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166,
105 Stat. 1071 (1991), extended coverage of the ADA to U.S. citizens employed in foreign countries by
U.S. employers. See Jay W. Waks, Workers' Rights Now Extend Overseas, NAT'L L.J.,
Dec. 23, 1991,
at 16.
113. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a).
114. See, e.g., Halton v. Great Clips, Inc., 94 F. Supp. 2d 856, 870 (N.D. Ohio 2000).
115. "The following private entities are considered public accommodations for purposes of this
subchapter, if the operations of such entities affect commerce:
a (f)laundromat, dry-cleaner, bank, barber shop, beauty shop, travel service, shoe repair
service,funeralparlor,gas station, office of an accountant or lawyer, pharmacy, insurance
office, professional office of a health care provider, hospital, or other service establishment ....
42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F) (emphasis added); see also Americans With DisabilitiesAct of 1989: Hearings
on S. 933, supra note 1,at 102-03 (legislative history showing express testimony on funeral home
discrimination against persons who died of AIDS-related causes).
116. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F).
117. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
118. See United States v. Morrison, 120 S.Ct. 1740 (2000) (striking civil remedy provision of the
Violence Against Women Act of 1994); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995) (holding that
the Gun-Free School Zones Act was unconstitutional because the possession of a gun in a local school
zone was not an economic activity that substantially affected interstate commerce).
119. The ADA broadly defines the term "commerce" as "travel, trade, traffic, commerce,
transportation, or communication - (A) among the several States; (B) between any foreign country or
any territory or possession and any State; or (C) between points in the same State but through another
State or foreign country." 42 U.S.C. § 12181(1). A discussion of how the operations of a funeral home
may affect interstate commerce appears in Mark E.Wojcik, AIDS and FuneralHomes: Common Legal
Issues Facing FuneralHome Directors,27 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 411,414-15 (1994). For a comparative
definition of "commerce" under a state statute, see 815 ILL. CoMP. STAT. 50511(0 (West 1999) (defining
"trade" and "commerce" under a state Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practice statute).

HeinOnline -- 53 Okla. L. Rev. 407 2000

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:389

A funeral home director who denies service to a person who dies of causes
related to HIV, or who attempts to charge more for those services, may violate
several provisions of the ADA, including:
(1) the duty to afford the goods and services of a place of public accommodation
on an equal basis;' "
121
(2) the duty to eliminate discriminatory eligibility criteria;
(3) the duty to make reasonable modifications of policies, practices, and
procedures; and
(5) the duty not to deny equal goods or services because of the known disability
of an individual."
Complaints of funeral home discrimination can be enforced privately" or else
they can be filed with the Public Access Section of the Civil Rights Division of the
U.S. Department of Justice." The Justice Department is authorized to bring a
civil action under title I,enforcing the ADA in any situation where a pattern or
practice of discrimination is believed to exist or a matter of general public
importance is raised.' Under this authority, the Justice Department has undertaken
a number of enforcement actions against funeral homes that discriminated against
persons who died of causes related to H1V. In one such case, the Justice
Department settled a complaint against a California funeral home director who
refused to provide funeral services to persons who died from AIDS-related
complications because of his own fear of contracting BIV.'" After being contacted
by the Justice Department, the owner agreed to provide funeral services and to
undergo training regarding universal precautions to prevent the transmission of
-I

.125

Other cases brought by the U.S. Department of Justice have involved acts of
discrimination such as overcharging for a funeral of a person who died of AIDSrelated causes. One advantage of having the Justice Department bring these cases
is that the funeral home cannot challenge the statutory standing of the Department
to bring a case, while it might be able to challenge the standing of an unmarried,
surviving life partner of a person who died of AIDS-related causes.

120. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii); 28 C.F.R. § 36.202(b).
121. See 42 U.S.C. §12182(b)(2)(A)(i); 28 C.F.R. § 36.301.
122. See 42 U.S.C. §12182(b)(2)(A)(ii); 28 C.F.R. § 36.302(a).
123. See 42 U.S.C. §12182(b)(1)(E); 28 C.F.R. § 36.205; see also, e.g., Settlement Agreement, supra
note 58.
124. See also Sandra Swift Parrino & A. Kent Waldrep, Letter to the Editor, Minus Tough Penalty
ADA Law is Toothless, WALL ST. J., June 14, 2000, at A27 (noting that disabled persons can enforce the
ADA without any personal monetary gain, and that the purpose of attorneys' fees to support those private
causes of action under the ADA is to provide legal representation for those who would not otherwise
have it to enforce their rights).

125. See, e.g., Wojcik & Austin, supra note 2, at 73.
126. 42 U.S.C. § 12188(b)(1)(B).
127. See infra notes 103-07 and accompanying text.
128. See Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Fnforcement Highlights: FightingDiscrimination
Against Persons With HIVIAIDS, available at <http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/ada/hivreprt.txt> (visited Oct.
31, 2000).
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b) State and Local Anti-DiscriminationLaw
In addition to the federal anti-discrimination law, state and local laws afford
additional protection for disabled and human rights. These disability and human
rights laws prohibit certain forms of discrimination in areas such as employment,'"
real estate transactions, " ' financial credit,"' and access to places of public
accommodation."' Moreover, these laws provide administrative and judicial
remedies for persons who suffer discrimination by places of public accommodation. "3
Under state disabilities laws, which are similar in scope to the ADA, funeral
homes are places of public accommodation. This is true even though funeral homes
may not be expressly listed in the state statutes. For example, the definition of a
"place of public accommodation" in the Illinois Human Rights Act is "a business,
accommodation .... or transportation facility of any kind, whether licensed or not,
whose goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations are
extended, offered, sold, or otherwise made available to the public."'"M As il-

lustrations of public accommodations covered under this definition, the Illinois

statute includes "funeral hearses, crematories, [and] cemeteries."'3 5 Because this
list is not meant to36 be exhaustive, it would likely also include "funeral homes" or
"funeral parlors."'
As places of public accommodation, funeral homes may not discriminate on the
basis of a disability or perceived disability."n It is undisputed that AIDS, HIV, and
the perception that someone has been infected with HIV are all covered under antidiscrimination laws. 3' A person who dies of an illness related to HIV is, thus, a

129. See, e.g., 725 ILL COMP. STAT. 5/2-101 (1992); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.02(G)
(Anderson Supp. 1999); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 495- 495e (1987 & Supp. 1992).
130. See, e.g., 725 ILL. COMp. STAT. 5/3-101 (1992); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12901 (1994) (incentives
to devise long-term comprehensive strategies for meeting the housing needs of persons with AIDS and
their families).
131. See, e.g., 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 514-101 (1992).
132. See, e.g., 725 ILL COmp. STAT. 515-101 (1992); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 272, § 98 (1991).
133. The ADA does not preempt these state and local laws. See 42 U.S.C. § 12201(b) (1994); H.R.
REP. No. 485, 101st Cong. 48, 135 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 418.
134. 725 ILL. CoMP. STAT. 5/5-101(A)(1).
135. Jd. 5-101(A)(2) (stating that the list of the different types of public accommodation is "by way
of example, but not limitation").
136. See id.; see also Wojcik & Austin, supranote 2, at 74.
137. Remedies for discrimination include court actions and administrative proceedings, including
the possible awards of attorneys' fees, litigation expenses and the costs of trial. See H.R. REP. No. 101485(11), at 140 (1990), reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 423. Where there is an issue of general
public importance in discrimination issues arising in entities such as funeral homes, the Attorney General
of the United States may also initiate civil actions to collect penalties of up to $50,000 for a first
violation and $100,000 for any subsequent violation. See 42 U.S.C. § 12188(b) (1994). The legislative
history encourages active enforcement by the Attorney General. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485(111), at 67
(1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 490.
138. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 101-485(11), at 51-52 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303,
330, 333-34; H.R. REP. No. 101-485(111), at 39 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 451, 461;
Doe v. Attorney Gen., 941 F.2d 780,797 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding doctor with AIDS "handicapped" under
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person who dies of an illness related to a perceived disability. Therefore, a refusal

to handle a person who has died of AIDS-related causes is discrimination against
a person with a perceived disability. The refusal would constitute discrimination

even though a funeral home may argue that someone who has died no longer has
a disability after death.

The view that funeral homes are places of public accommodation that are
prohibited from discriminating against persons with HIV under disability and human
rights laws was confirmed in DiMiceli & Sons Funeral Home v. New York City
Commission on Human Rights.'39 The Human Rights Commission issued a

complaint against a funeral home that not only charged inflated fees when persons
died of causes related to AIDS, but also insisted that family members purchase
costly extras such as glass-sealed caskets.'" The funeral home argued that

discrimination against the "physically handicapped" did not extend to those who
have died of causes related to BIY. The funeral home also argued that funeral
homes were not places of public accommodation under the human rights code.'

The DiMiceli court rejected both arguments. The court found that the term

"physically handicapped" extended "to those individuals who have died due to
complications associated with the AIDS virus and to their family members who
have been stigmatized by their association with the deceased."'43 The court also

section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act); Severino v. North Fort Myers Fire Control Dist., 935 F.2d 1179,
1182 n.4 (lth Cir. 1991) (finding fire fighter with HIV "handicapped" under section 504 of
Rehabilitation Act); Glanz v. Vemick, 756 F. Supp. 632, 635 (D. Mass. 1991) (finding patient with HIV
"handicapped" under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act); Cain v. Hyatt, 734 F. Supp. 671, 678 (E.D.
Pa. 1990) (finding attorney with HIV "handicapped" under Pennsylvania Human Relations Act); Leckelt
v. Board of Conun'rs of Hosp. Dist. No. 1,714 F. Supp. 1377, 1385 n.4 (E.D. La. 1989), affd, 909 F.2d
820 (5th Cir. 1990).
139. No. 19527/86 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 9. 1987), reprinted in MICHAEL L. CLOSEN ET AL., AIDS:
CASES & MATERIALS 490-93 (1989) [hereinafter CLOSEN ET AL., AIDS: CASES & MATERIALS]; N.Y.
L.J., Jan. 14, 1987, at 12.
140. See CLOsEN Er AL., AIDS: CASES & MATEUALS, supra note 139, at 491.
141. See id.
at 491-92.
142. See id.
143. See id.
at 492. The court reasoned that:
The phrase "substantially limits one or more major life activities" serves only to define
"physical or mental impairment" and does not imply that statutory protection is afforded
only to those who are discriminated against while alive. There is adequate precedent for
affording the individual dignity and freedom from discrimination not only in those
activities and services performed during one's life, but also in those activities and services
performed at one's death. The moral precepts and public policy that dictates the
elimination of discrimination based solely upon one's color, creed, race, nationality or
handicap, are not extinguished with the end of a life, but continue through the final
services administered in death. There is statutory precedent for extending protection from
discriminatory practices by facilities that provide services for the dead. Additionally, the
party aggrieved in the situation isthe family or life partner of the individual who has died
from AIDS. It is the remaining life partner or family members who suffer discrimination.
Traditionally, family members have received compensation where they have sued for the
negligent handling of a body. The legal theory incorporated is based upon the family's
quasi-property right in the body. The Court of Appeals has advised that "such a property
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found that the human rights laws included funeral homes as places of public
accommodation. The court noted that the human rights code did not expressly cover
or exclude funeral homes from coverage.'" Moreover, the DiMiceli court followed
the reasoning of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in which it held that
nonsectarian cemeteries were places of public accommodation under the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act. That court reasoned that the "public need for the
services made available by cemeteries is irrefutably all inclusive - all of us, at one
time or another, will be entrusted unto their care. All of those factors bring

cemeteries squarely into the public domain and give them a special status.""'
Following this reasoning, the DiMiceli court held the basic premise of "special
status" to be "equally applicable to funeral homes because of the similarity in the
care and services provided."'" Thus, the court held that funeral homes were places

of public accommodation.'"
Although federal and state law provide anti-discrimination protection for

individuals with IHV who seek access to funeral homes, the actual filing of a
discrimination claim against funeral homes may prove more complicated because
of problems relating to standing. The deceased individuals themselves are unable
to bring discrimination claims. Furthermore, the representatives of the estate are
often too emotionally distraught to pursue litigation or administrative remedies 4 .
that would challenge discriminatory practices so widespread that they appear to

define industry practice. As a result, many acts of discrimination have gone
unchallenged.

right is little more than a fiction, in reality the personal feelings of the survivors are being
protected." Thus, the courts have extended legal protections to remaining family members
when improper services are rendered to the deceased. Different treatment should not be
afforded family members where discrimination is extended from the victim of the disease
to family members who are already suffering from the loss of a loved one.
Id.
144. See id. at 493.
145. Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n v. Alto-Reste Park Cemetery Ass'n, 306 A.2d 881,
886-87 (Pa. 1973).
146. CLoSEN Er AL., AIDS CASES & MATERIALS, supra note 139, at 490, 493. The court could
additionally have found that funeral homes are places of public accommodation because funeral homes
are specifically empowered by state statutes to provide funeral services to the public. Persons who die
of illness related to HIV are thus entitled to be protected from discrimination in funeral services. This
protection extends to the provision of or securing of the life partners and families of those who die of
illnesses related to HIV.
147. See id.; see also Sattlerv. New York Comm'n on Human Rights, 554 N.Y.S.2d 763,767 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1990), affid, 580 N.Y.S.2d 35 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992); Hurwitz v. New York City Common on
Human Rights, 535 N.Y.S.2d 1007, 1013 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988), affd, 553 N.Y.S.2d 323 (N.Y. App. Div.
1990).
148. In Chicago, for example, administrative remedies may be available from the Chicago
Commission on Human Relations, the Cook County Commission on Human Rights, and the Illinois
Department of Human Rights.
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2. Tort Law
Tort law has traditionally protected various aspects of human dignity. In the midtwentieth century, a better understanding of "the realities of emotional life, and
perhaps a more aspirational attitude on the part of courts, led to a belief.., that the
law should give further protection to emotional interests than the traditional theories
provided."'49 As part of this development in the law, "courts permitted recovery
for anguish caused by the mishandling of dead bodies."'" As one commentator
noted, "the affectional bonds [between the relative and the decedent] serve as a
conceptual incorporation of the decedent's body into the person of the relative." ''
Under tort law, a funeral home director or other person who prevents a proper
burial or cremation of a person who dies of AIDS-related causes may face civil
liability.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts provides, "One who intentionally, recklessly
or negligently removes, withholds, mutilates or operates upon the body of a dead
person or prevents its proper interment or cremation is subject to liability to a
member of the family of the deceased who is entitled to the disposition of the
body."' Thus, a person "who is entitled to the disposition of the body of a
deceased person" may sue a person who "intentionally, recklessly, or negligently
mistreats or improperly deals with the body, or prevents its proper burial or
cremation."'" The American Law Institute took no position on whether this

liability would extend "to persons other than family members who have an interest
in the body,"" such as a gay or lesbian partner who might not traditionally be
recognized under state law as having an "interest" in the body.'55

149. MARSHALL S. SHAPO, BASIC PRINCIPLES OF TORT LAW 13.01, at 38 (1999).
150. i.
151. Ducor, supra note 3, at 231.
152. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 868 (1977).
153. ld. § 868 cmt. a. Under this section of the Restatement, liability attaches:
[N]ot only to an intentional interference with the body itself or with its proper burial or
cremation, but also to an interference that is reckless or merely negligent. Thus an
undertaker who negligently embalms the body, a carrier that negligently transports it or
an automobile driver who negligently collides with the hearse and dumps the corpse out
into the highway will be subject to liability, if the result is harm to the body or prevention
of its proper burial or cremation.
Id. § 868 cmt. d.
154. 1& § 868 caveat. The Institute noted that the decisions that had allowed recovery for
interference with a corpse:
[Have thus far been those in which the plaintiff has been the person entitled to
disposition of the body or one of a group, such as children of the deceased, who have
equal right of disposition. In the absence of decisions, the Institute expresses no opinion
on whether one who is not entitled to the disposition [of the body] may not, under some
circumstances, have a cause of action for his [or her] own mental distress under the
principle stated in this Section.
Id. § 868 cmt. g.
155. The American Law Institute noted that it was not within the scope of the Restatement of Torts
to determine who should be entitled to the disposition of a dead body. Id. § 868 cmt. b. The Institute
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A comment to this section of the Restatement (Second) explains that the

"technical basis" for recognizing the tort of mishandling a body relates to the
interference with a person's "exclusive right" to control disposition of the body:
The technical basis of the cause of action is the interference with the
exclusive right of control of the body, which frequently has been called
by the courts a "property" or "quasi-property" right. This does not,

however, fit very well into the category of property, since the body
ordinarily cannot be sold or transferred, has no utility and can be used

only for the one purpose of interment or cremation. In practice the
technical right has served as a mere peg upon which to hang damages

for the mental distress inflicted upon the survivor; and in reality the
cause of action has been exclusively one for the mental distress."
The observation in the comment that the utility of a corpse is essentially limited
to the single purpose of "interment or cremation" may need to be re-evaluated in
light of recent developments in the scientific and medical uses of dead bodies. It

may also be necessary to examine the rationale underlying many court decisions that
have found that survivors "have no property rights in the remains of a decedent."'"

Although some courts see no monetary value in a dead body, new information on
the economics of dead bodies and developments in state and federal law... may
require a second look at the rationale underlying this section of the Restatement. For
example, one report found that a dead body "can yield more than 130 pieces of
59
tissue once it is extracted, sterilized, cut up, packaged and sold."' An estimate
noted that various state statutes and common law rules would govern the issue, and that "[n]ormally the
right of disposition is in the surviving spouse, if any; or if none, then in the next of kin in order of
succession. It may, however, be in the executor or administrator of the deceased." Id.
156. Id. § 868 cmt. a. The Restatement notes that because "[there is no need to show physical
consequences of the mental distress," the rule in section 868 has much in common with the rules of
Restatement sections 46, 312, and 313. Id.
157. See, e.g., Perry v. Saint Francis Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 886 F. Supp. 1551, 1563 (D.Kan. 1995)
("Kansas common law on this matter is no different from the position universally held by other states
which recognizes no property right, commercial or material, in the corpse itself but only a right of
possession in order to dispose of the corpse appropriately."); State v. Powell, 497 So. 2d 1188, 1191 (Fla.
1986) ("All authorities generally agree that the next of kin have no property right in the remains of a
decedent'). But compareDougherty v. Mercantile-Safe Deposit &Trust Co., 387 A.2d 244,246 n.2 (Md.
1978) ("It is universally recognized that there is no property in a dead body in a commercial or material
sense") with Travelers Ins. Co. v. Smith, 991 S.W.2d 591, 595 (Ark. 1999) ("A quasi-property right in
dead bodies vests in the nearest relatives of the deceased, arising out of their duty to bury the dead.")
and Crockett v. Stewart Essex & Turpin Funeral Home, Inc., 19 S.W.2d 585, 589 (Ark. 2000).
158. As one court notes:
[O]rgan donation is a matter of both state and federal law. In 1986, Congress directed that
in order to remain eligible for any federal Medicare or Medicaid funds, hospitals must
establish written protocols to ensure that the families of potential donors are informed of
their option to donate their deceased kin's organs and to carry out any donation.
Ramirez v. Health Partners of S. Ariz., 972 P.2d 658, 661 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1998) (citing Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1986 § 9318(a), Pub. L. No. 99-509, 100 Stat. 1874, 2009, codified as amended

at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320b-8 (West 1991 & Supp. 1998)).
159. Stephen J.Hedges & William Gaines, Donor Bodies Milled Into Growing Profits: Little
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of the potential "total worth of all the usable tissue" from the various pieces taken
from a human body is "more than $230,000."'" However, not all of the usable
tissue is taken from each body. "Because not all the tissue from a single donor is
usually taken, the average market yield per cadaver is closer to $80,000," according
to "industry executives."'' It is a lucrative business overall in the United States
and other countries.' In 1999, the estimated revenues for four of the leading
tissue companies totaled $173.3 million." While dead bodies may have been

"worthless" in the past, advances in technology have altered that
economically
1

reality. '
The Restatement comment did not anticipate the medical and scientific advances;
it is no longer true that a dead body "can be used only for the one purpose of
interment or cremation.""s Although the law might appear to be well-settled from
the pronouncements of some courts and scholars, it is probably more accurate to
state that "[t]he present legal position toward property rights in the human body is
unsettled and reflects no consistent philosophy or approach."'" While there are a
number of statutes that touch aspects of this issue, "tihe statutes that address
individuals' control over their bodies delineate the extent of that control in specific

situations, but do not establish a general principle."'6 7 In any event, future cases
may find it easier to recover for interference with a burial or funeral service,

especially if the interference was for private commercial gain.
The first version of the Restatement of Torts limited liability for wrongful
interference with a dead body to those cases where there was wanton or intentional
misconduct.s It provided that, "[a] person who wantonly mistreats the body of

RegulatedIndustry Thrives on UnsuspectingFamilies, CHI. TRIB., May 21, 2000, § 1,at 1.The lucrative
nature of this business has also lead to a growing, and largely unregulated, trade in body tissue and
organs. See, e.g., Stephen J. Hedges, Tissue Imports Pose Hazardv - Deadly Contamination Found in
Shipments From Abroad, CHI. TRIB., May 22, 2000, §1, at 1; Mike Doming, Body Parts Trade Faces
U.S. Probe- Abuse Reports Prompt Inquiry, CHI. TRiB., June 9, 2000, § i, at 1, 26.
160. Hedges & Gaines, supranote 159, at 1.
161. ld.
162. See, e.g., Sean R. Fitzgibbons, Cadaveric Organ Donation and Consent: A Comparative
Analysis of the United States, Japan, Singapore,and China, 6 ILSA J. INrL & COMP. L. 73, 101 (1999)
(describing horrific practice in China of harvesting organs from executed prisoners and selling them to
the highest bidder).
163. See Hedges & Gaines, supranote 159, at 16.
164. See, e.g., Doming, supra note 159, at 26. The organs and tissues of persons who die of AIDSrelated causes are unlikely to be used for transmission purposes for fear of transmitting HIV infection
to the recipients, but the point here, however, is to reexamine the rationale of the Restatement comment
in light of subsequent economic developments.
165. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 868 cmt. a (1977). The Restatement notes that because
"[t]here is no need to show physical consequences of the mental distress," the rule in section 868 has
much in common with the rules of Restatement sections 46, 312, and 313. Id.
166. Hecht v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275, 281 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (addressing the
confused state of the law as to various body parts and fluids).
167. Id. (citing Michelle Bourianoff Bray, Note, PersonalizingPersonalty:Towarda PropertyRight
in Human Bodies, 69 TEX. L. REV. 209, 220 (1990)).
168. See, e.g., Ramirez v. Health Partners of S. Ariz., 972 P.2d 658, 665-66 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1998).
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a dead person or who without privilege intentionally removes, withholds or operates
upon the dead body is liable to the member of the family of such person who is
entitled to the disposition of the body."'" A comment to that first Restatement
provided that "[t]his right exists although there has been no harm except such harm
to the feelings as is inseparable from the knowledge of the defendant's conduct."'7

Furthermore, "[tihe right to maintain an action for intentional interference with the
body exists although there was no intent to do a tortious act, as where a body is
misdelivered by the railroad or where a surgeon performs an autopsy mistakenly
believing that he is privileged to do so.'' However, there was no liability under
the first Restatement "for mere negligence in dealing with the body."'" Liability

for "unintentional harms to the body" arose "only if wantonly caused.""'
The Restatement (Second) of Torts expanded the liability expressed in the first

Restatement by including liability for negligent acts.

A small but growing group

of jurisdictions appear to have accepted the new expanded view of liability for the
negligent treatment of a dead body. Those jurisdictions include California,'"
Idaho, 76 Michigan,'" New Jersey,"' New York,"
North Carolina,"

169. REsTAmMEN OF TORTS § 868, at 402-03 (1939).
170. let cmt. a.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. Comment b noted that "[t]he cause of action is primarily for mental suffering caused by
the improper dealing with the body. It includes also the right to recover damages for physical harm
resulting from such mental suffering." Id. cmt. b.
174. See REsTAWmENr (SECOND) OF TORTs § 868 (1977). The Restatement (Second) represented
a change from the first Restatement, "in which recovery for mental anguish caused by interference with
the right to burial of a body was limited to those cases in which wanton or malicious conduct was
shown." Robert A. Brazener, Annotation, Civil Liability of Undertaker in Connection With Embalming
or Preparation of a Body for Burial, 48 A.L.R.3D 261, 271 (1973) (commenting on a draft of the
Restatement (Second)).
175. See Christensen v. Superior Court, 820 P.2d 181, 192-93, 204 (Cal. 1991) (mortuary sold body
parts to a biological supply company and otherwise mishandled human remains). In that case, the
California Supreme Court stated that "[t]he next of kin, while not in the full proprietary sense of'owning'
the body of the deceased, have property rights in the body which will be protected, and for a violation
of which they are entitled to indemnification." Id. at 193; see also Aguirre-Alvarez v. Regents of the
Univ. of Cal., 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 580, 583, 585, 587 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (alleging that failure of hospital
to notify family prevented proper disposition of his remains).
176. See Brown v. Matthews Mortuary, Inc., 801 P.2d 37, 38, 43-44 (Idaho 1990) (adopting the
Restatement (Second) and allowing emotional distress damages for the negligent cremation of the wrong
body).
177. See Allinger v. Kell, 302 N.W.2d 576, 579 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981), modified on appeal, 309
N.W.2d 547 (Mich. 1981) (parents sued funeral home and county deputy medical examiner for mental
distress arising from alleged mutilation of daughter's corpse for criminal investigation); see also Vogelaar
v. United States, 665 F. Supp. 1295, 1306 (E.D. Mich. 1987) ("One who . . . negligently . . .
withholds.. . the body of a dead person or prevents its proper internment or cremation is subject to
liability to a member of the family of the deceased who is entitled to the disposition of the body.").
178. See Strachan v. John F. Kennedy Mem'l Hosp., 538 A.2d 346, 353 (N.J. 1988) (recognizing
"the obvious" proposition that section 868 involved the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress).
179. See Thompson v. Duncan Bros. Funeral Homes, Inc., 455 N.Y.S.2d 324, 326 (N.Y. Civ. Ct.
1982) (awarding $35,000 to mother whose son was negligently embalmed; the court noted that the law
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Ohio,' Vermont," and West Virginia.'83 Jurisdictions that recognize this cause
of action under the Restatement (Second) do not require that a person seeking
recovery have a "contemporaneous sensory perception of the negligent act. WPA
The majority of jurisdictions continue to adhere to the first Restatement and

impose liability only for interference that is "intentional or malicious," as opposed
to "negligent interference." Jurisdictions apparently in that majority include
Alaska,1sS

Arkansas,"

and

Colorado,'"

the

District

of

Columbia,'"

in New York has not been primarily concerned with the extent of physical mishandling or injury to a
dead body, but rather how much the improper handling affected the feelings and emotions of the
survivors); see also 18 N.Y. Jur. 2d Cemeteriesand Dead Bodies § 91 (1999). For a case involving the
first Restatement in New York, see Cercelli v. Wein, 303 N.Y.S.2d 316, 318 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1969)
(citing, among other sources, the first Restatement in a case involving the failure of a hotel to check on
a guest who had died in his room). See also Baumann v. White, 234 N.Y.S.2d 272, 273 (N.Y. Sup. CL
1962) (allowing damages against a funeral home for failing to properly prepare a body for burial).
180. See Dumouchelle v. Duke Univ., 317 S.E.2d 100, 102-03 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984) (noting that
a person entitled to possess a body may recover damages for mental suffering caused by intentional or
negligent or mishandling or mutilation of the body).
181. See Carney v. Knollwood Cemetery Ass'n, 514 N.E.2d 430, 435 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986) ("The
law is not primarily concerned with the extent of physical injury to the bodily remains but with whether
there were any improper actions and whether such actions caused emotional or physical suffering to the
living kin."); Wallin v. University of Cincinnati Hosp., 698 N.E.2d 530, 531-32 (Ohio Ct. Cl. 1998)
(denying a cause of action for wrongfully reporting that a woman's son had HIV); see also Brotherton
v. Cleveland, 173 F.3d 552 (6th Cir. 1999) (litigation for improper removal of corneas); Grill v. Abele
Funeral Home, Inc., 42 N.E.2d 788, 789 (Ohio Ct. App. 1940) (denying liability under the first
Restatement against a mortician who removed jewelry from a corpse because it did not involve willful
or malicious conduct on the part of the mortician).
182. See Jobin v. McQuillen, 609 A.2d 990, 994 (Vt. 1992) ("[t]n cases involving the negligent
mishandling of family members' corpses, plaintiffs need not allege additional elements of damage in
order to recover for mental suffering.").
183. See Whitehair v. Highland Memory Gardens, Inc., 327 S.E.2d 438, 443 (W.Va. 1985)
(adopting section 868 and acknowledging a quasi-property right in a dead body).
184. See, e.g., Jaynes v. Strong-Throne Mortuary, Inc., 954 P.2d 45, 51 (N.M. 1997).
185. See Bums v. Anchorage Funeral Chapel, 495 P.2d 70, 73 (Alaska 1972) (citing the first
Restatement in an unsuccessful claim against a funeral home for embalming a body without first
obtaining the consent of the next of kin); see also Edwards v. Franke, 364 P.2d 60, 63 (Alaska 1961)
("It is generally the law in this country that the right to possess, preserve and bury, or otherwise dispose
of, a dead body belongs to the surviving spouse and, if none such, then to the next of kin in the order
of their relation to the decedent; that a violation of that right is a tort; and that damages for mental
suffering are recoverable for a willful invasion of the rights relating to dead bodies.").
186. See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Smith, 991 S.W.2d 591, 596 (Ark. 1999); Crockett v. Stewart Essex
and Turpin Funeral Home, Inc., No. 00-136, 2000 WL 730250 (Ark. June 8,2000).
187. See Culpepper v. Pearl Street Bldg., Inc., 877 P.2d 877,880-81 (Colo. 1994) (reviewing section
868 but declining to adopt it, in part because it had not been raised by the parties at the trial court level
and was raised sua sponte by the Colorado Court of Appeals); Kimelman v. City of Colorado Springs,
775 P.2d 51, 52 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988) ("We therefore decline to adopt the Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 868 . ..

.").

In earlier cases, Colorado allowed recovery when the mishandling of a body was willful

and wanton. See, e.g., Culpepper, 877 P.2d at 880 n.4 (citing Spomer v. City of Grand Junction, 355
P.2d 960 (Colo. 1960), and Fitzsimmons v. Olinger Mortuary Ass'n, 17 P.2d 535 (Colo. 1932)); see also
Schwalb v. Connely, 179 P.2d 667,671 (Colo. 1947) (citing the first Restatement in an action to recover
damages for an unauthorized autopsy).
188. See Washington v. John T. Rhines Co., 646 A.2d 345, 349 (D.C. 1994) (denying recovery for
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Kansas, 193 Maryland,'" MasFlorida,'
Georgia,"
Illinois,'
Indiana,"
South Dakota,1"
sachusetts,' New Mexico,'" Oklahoma," Pennsylvania,'

a widow who attempted to sue funeral home for negligent infliction of emotional distress for the alleged
mishandling of her husband's corpse). A dissenting opinion would have adopted the Restatement
(Second). See id. at 351 (Schwelb, J., dissenting); see also Plummer v. District of Columbia Bd. of
Funeral Dir., 730 A.2d 159 (D.C. 1999); District of Columbia v. Smith, 436 A.2d 1294, 1299 (D.C.
1981) (refusing to adopt the Restatement (Second)).
189. See Gonzalez v. Metropolitan Dade County Pub. Health Trust, 626 So. 2d 1030, 1033 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1993), affd, 651 So. 2d 673 (Fla. 1995). In declining to adopt the Restatement (Second),
the Florida Supreme Court stated that "[a]n action for mental anguish based on negligent handling of a
dead body requires proof of either physical injury or willful or wanton misconduct." Id. at 676; see also
State v. Powell, 497 So. 2d 1188, 1191 n.3 (Fla. 1986), cert. denied., 481 U.S. 1059 (1981); Williams
v. City of Minneola, 575 So. 2d 683, 689, 695 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 199 1) (involving a police officer who
took home a videotape of a dead body and showed the video in his home; the family of the murder
victim sued for tortuous interference with the body, but the court found that a videotape of the body was
not the body itself and denied recovery), review denied, 589 So. 2d 289 (Fla. 1991). At least one judge
has stated his belief that the Restatement (Second) represents "the better rule," but that its adoption must
come from the Florida Supreme Court. See Gonzalez, 626 So. 2d at 1033 (Cope, J., specially
concurring).
190. See Pyle v. Pyle, 531 S.E.2d 738 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000).
191. "Illinois does not recognize a cause of action for emotional distress arising from the negligent
mishandling of a corpse." Courtney v. Saint Joseph Hosp., 500 N.E.2d 703, 707 (111.App. Ct. 1986)
(believing that Illinois Supreme Court precedent required a "physical injury" or "impact," the court
rejected section 868 and a negligence claim brought by a widow whose husband's body was rendered
unfit for viewing in an open casket). The Illinois Appellate Court did not foreclose the possibility of a
future change in the law, stating that it did not believe that "recognizing a cause of action for the
negligent mishandling of a corpse would open the door for fraudulent claims or encourage frivolous
litigation." ld. at 705.
192. See Schuler v. Posey County, Ind., 927 F. Supp. 1127, 1130 (S.D. Ind. 1996).
193. See Burgess v. Perdue, 721 P.2d 239, 245 (Kan. 1986) (finding that a physician who
mistakenly performed an autopsy could be liable only if his actions were intentional or malicious, rather
than merely negligent); see also Perry v. Saint Francis Hosp. & Medical Ctr., 865 F. Supp. 724, 728-29
(D. Kan. 1994) (family sued Red Cross and hospital for improper removal of bones and eyes from the
deceased without their consent).
194. See Walser v. Resthaven Memorial Gardens, Inc., 633 A.2d 466, 471-73, 475 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1993) (in an action involving disinterment of a body without notification of all family members,
the court noted that section 868 of the Restatement (Second) was most frequently invoked in cases arising
before burial or in cases arising from wrongful burials, including negligence in conducting burials or in
the manner of intemment).
195. See Sackett v. Saint Mary's Church Soc'y, 464 N.E.2d 956, 957-58 (Mass. App. Ct. 1984)
(denying a claim for mishandling a casket because the plaintiffs suffered no physical injury and the
mishandling was neither intentional nor reckless); see also Kelley v. Post Publ'g Co., 98 N.E.2d 286, 287
(Mass. 1951) (noting that Massachusetts had adopted the first Restatement but finding that it did not
apply to showing merely the photograph of a body).
196. See Jaynes v. Strong-Thome Mortuary, Inc., 954 P.2d 45, 51 (N.M. 1998) (declining an
opportunity to determine whether to recognize a cause of action in tort for a funeral director's negligent
infliction of emotional distress).
197. See Dean v. Chapman, 556 P.2d 257,262 (Okla. 1976) (noting that daughter sued state medical
examiner for failing to timely deliver her father's body; the court stated that "facts sufficient to allege...
a willful wrong were not present....").
198. See Papieves v. Lawrence, 263 A.2d 118, 121 (Pa. 1970) (noting that parents filed for mental
anguish and emotional disturbance caused by a defendant who withheld the body of their son after he
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Washington,'e and Wisconsin." ' Other jurisdictions, such as Arizona,' may
apply section 868 of the Restatement (Second) to "claims of wrongful disinterment,
burial, and disposal of a decedent's remains," but not to actions arising in the
context of organ donations.
The overall principle is that liability will generally attach for tortuous interference
with a dead body' - the only question between the majority and minority views
is whether the level of interference is sufficient. As Prosser notes:

hit him with his car and then burying him to avoid prosecution for the crime); Hackett v. United Airlines,
528 A.2d 971,974,975 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987) (expressly rejected section 868 of the Restatement (Second)
and denied a daughter's claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress against an airline that
mishandled the casket of her father), appeal denied, 544 A.2d 961 (Pa. 1988); see also Kearney v. City
of Philadelphia, 616 A.2d 72, 74 (Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 1992) (noting only the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court can change the law and adopt the Restatement (Second)).
199. See Chisum v. Behrens, 283 N.W.2d 235, 239-40 (S.D. 1979); see also Galvin v. McGilley
Memorial Chapels, 746 S.W.2d 588, 591-92 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (purporting to apply South Dakota law,
but stating wrongly that the Restatement view was the majority view).
200. See Corrigal v. Ball & Dodd Funeral Home, Inc., 577 P.2d 580, 582 (Wash. 1978) (allowing
recovery to a woman who sued a funeral home for negligent infliction of emotional distress when she
discovered that the material she was sifting through was the cremated remains of her son. The court held
that the woman had alleged objective physical manifestations and could maintain a cause of action). The
case arose before the Restatement (Second) had been promulgated.
201. See Scarpaci v. Milwaukee County, 292 N.W.2d 816, 822 (Wis. 1980) (denying recovery for
negligent performance of autopsy because the plaintiff suffered no physical injury).
202. See Ramirez v. Health Partners of S. Ariz., 972 P.2d 658, 665-66 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1998) (noting
also that the Arizona Supreme Court "has cautioned against mindlessly following the Restatement in lock
step fashion 'when to do so would result in the recognition of a new cause of action in this jurisdiction."')
(citation omitted); see also Hale v. Brown, 323 P.2d, 955 963 (Ariz. 1958) (Phelps and Struckmeyer, JJ.,
dissenting) (in a case arising before the Restatement (Second), using the first Restatement to clarify that
wrongful embalming is a willful tort for which a plaintiff may recover damages even without proving
actual damages); Morton v. Maricopa County, 865 P.2d 808, 812 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993) (the family of
a murder victim successfully alleged negligence against the county coroner and county sheriff for
cremating the body before properly identifying it).
203. See, e.g., Travelers Ins. Co. v. Smith, 991 S.W.2d 591, 596 (Ark. 1999) ("Courts have, to a
great extent, based civil liability for wrongful acts with regard to a dead body on the interference with
the right of burial .. ").Compare Doxtator v. Chicago & W.M. Ry. Co., 79 N.W. 922, 922 (Mich.
1899) ("[lIt has been held in a number of well-considered American cases that the one whose duty it is
to care for the body of the deceased is entitled to possession of the body, as it is when death comes, and
that it is an actionable wrong for another to interfere with that right by withholding the body or
mutilating it in any way") with Dampier v. Grace Hosp. Corp., 592 N.W.2d 809, 816 (Mich. Ct. App.
1999) (denying liability for mishandling of body by hospital). Where the right of burial is not involved,
however, but the case involves disturbing a body buried years earlier, some courts may not always
recognize a separate cause of action. See also Walser v. Resthaven Memorial Gardens, Inc., 633 A.2d
466,472 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993). An additional caveat to the general rule is found in Williams v. City
of Minneola, 575 So. 2d 683 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991), where the court denied a cause of action for
tortious interference with a body after a police officer had videotaped an autopsy and later played the
tape for a friend who was visiting his home. The court denied a cause of action to the family of the
deceased because "[a]n invariable component of the tort is some action affecting the physical body itself,
such as removing it, withholding it, mishandling it, mutilating it, or preventing its proper burial." Id. at
689. The court found that showing a videotape of the body did not involve mishandling of the body
itself. See id.
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Finally, there are a great many cases involving the mishandling of dead
bodies, whether by mutilation, disinterment, interference with proper
burial, or other forms of intentional disturbance. In most of these cases
the courts have talked of a somewhat dubious "property right" to the
body, usually in the next of kin, which did not exist while the decedent
was living, cannot be conveyed, can be used only for the one purpose
of burial, and not only has no pecuniary value but is a source of
liability for funeral expenses. It seems reasonably obvious that such
"property" is something evolved out of thin air to meet the occasion,
and that in reality the personal feelings of the survivors are being
protected, under a fiction likely to deceive no one but a lawyer.
Some cases have avoided all of these difficulties by recognizing what
is sufficiently obvious, that the tort is in reality merely the intentional
infliction of mental distress.
In addition to a cause of action for negligent or intentional mishandling of a
body, the survivors may have additional tort claims on their own behalf, depending
on the actions that the funeral home director may have taken against the living
individuals. These claims might include outrage or intentional infliction of
emotional distress, invasion of privacy, and possible complaints under the range of
federal, state, and local anti-discrimination laws.
3. ContractLaw
A person who makes a contract with a funeral home for services may have an
action for breach of contract if those services are not performed according to the
contract. The funeral home, if it even admits that a contract has been breached, will
likely argue in such a case that the damages should be limited to the value of the
contract. Damages for a breach of contract are normally limited to "injuries
which may reasonably be considered as arising naturally from the breach of contract
itself, or such as may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of
the parties, at the time of contracting, as the probable result of the breach."'
Damages for emotional distress for breach of contract, for example, are normally
not available.' In the context of a funeral, however, the law recognizes that
special damages may be available for breach of contract. As one court stated:
Contracts for funeral and burial services are imbued by the very nature
of their subject with certain expectations to be implied in fact unless
specifically disclaimed. It is to be expected that damages for cognizable

204. W. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 12, at 63 (5th ed. 1984).
205. For example, if a person makes a pre-need contract with a funeral home and the funeral home
later refuses to perform those services because the person died of causes related to AIDS, the funeral
home may argue that the damages for its breach be limited to the amount paid for the original pre-need

contract.
206. Meyer v. Nottger, 241 N.W.2d 911, 920 (Iowa 1976) (citing, inter alia,
5 CORBIN ON
CONTRACTs § 1007, at 70 (1964) and Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Exch. 34, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854)).
207. See, e.g., Lamam v. Shingleton, 55 S.E.2d 810, 813 (N.C. 1949).
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harm to the ordinary emotional sensibilities of any family member, in
general, and known emotional sensibilities, in particular, will be
recoverable for a breach of the funeral provider's obligation to exercise
reasonable skill and care.2
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts provides: "Recovery for emotional
disturbance will be excluded unless the breach also caused bodily harm or the
contract or the breach is of such a kind that serious emotional disturbance was a
particularly likely result."'' The Restatement acknowledges that the breach of a
contract for the proper disposition of a dead body is a breach that is "particularly
likely to cause serious emotional disturbance." 1'
The Restatement also gives the following illustration of the rule that allows
special damages for breach of a funeral contract:
A makes a contract with B to conduct the funeral for B's husband and
to provide a suitable casket and vault for his burial. Shortly thereafter,
B discovers that, because A knowingly failed to provide a vault with a
suitable lock, water has entered it and reinterment is necessary. B
suffers shock, anguish and illness as a result. In an action by B against
A for breach of contract, the element of emotional disturbance will be
included as loss for which damages may be awarded. " '
As authority for that illustration of the rule, the Restatement authors cited a North
Carolina decision that reversed the dismissal of a widow's breach of contract claim
against a funeral home. 2 The funeral home buried the woman's husband in what
was meant to be a watertight casket and vault that the funeral home had promised
would protect his body for years 3 After a "very rainy spell of weather," the top
of the vault rose about six inches above ground level."' As the funeral home
employees and the cemetery authorities were preparing to reinter the body, they
found that water and mud had entered the vault and that the casket was wet.215 In
finding that the funeral home should be liable for breach of contract, the court stated
that the funeral home employees had

208. Flores v. Baca, 871 N.M. 962, 967 (N.M. 1994). Thus, "because of the nature of a funeral and
burial contract, an emotional distress claim for the breach of such a contract would be within the
contemplation of the parties." Id. at 970; see aiso, e.g., Chelini v. Nieri, 196 P.2d 915, 916 (Cal. 1948);
Meyer v. Nottger, 241 N.W.2d 911, 921 (Iowa 1976); Lamm v. Shingleton, 55 S.E.2d 810, 813 (N.C.
1949); Clark v. Smith, 494 S.W.2d 192, 198 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973); Jack Leavitt, The Funeral Director's
Liabilityfor Mental Anguish, 15 HASTINGS U. 464, 466 (1964).
209. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 353 (1981).
210. Id. § 353 cmt. a.
211. Id.§ 353 illus.3.
212. REsTATEMENT (SECoND) OF CONTRACTS § 853 (1981) (citing Lamm v. Shingleton, 55 S.E.2d
810 (N.C. 1949)).
213. See Lamm 55 S.E.2d at 811.
214. Id.at 811.
215. See id

HeinOnline -- 53 Okla. L. Rev. 420 2000

20001

DISCRIMINATION AFTER DEATH

held themselves out as specially qualified to perform the duties of an
undertaker. When they undertook to conduct the funeral of plaintiffs
deceased husband they impliedly covenanted to perform the services
contemplated by the contract in a good and workmanlike manner. Any
breach of the duty thus assumed was a breach of the duty imposed by
the contract and not by law."6
In further holding that the funeral home should be liable for damages for
emotional distress suffered by the widow for the breach of contract, the court stated:
The tenderest feelings of the human heart center around the remains
of the dead. When the defendants contracted with plaintiff to inter the
body of her deceased husband in a workmanlike manner they did so
with the knowledge that she was the widow and would naturally and
probably suffer mental anguish if they failed to fulfil [sic] their
contractual obligation ....The contract was predominantly personal
in nature and no substantial pecuniary loss would follow its breach. Her
mental concern, her sensibilities, and her solicitude were the prime
considerations for the contract, and the contract itself was such as to put
the defendants on notice that a failure on their part to inter the body
properly would probably produce mental suffering on her part. It cannot
be said, therefore, that such damages were not within the contemplation
of the parties at the time the contract was made." 7
A second case cited by the drafters of the Restatement also acknowledged that in
"cases involving services furnished in connection with deaths and funerals, the
courts, recognizing the special nature of the situation, have created special
exceptions to the ordinary rules disallowing damages for mental suffering only." '
Those damages can be quite significant. In one trial, a New Mexico jury returned

216. ld.
at 812. Furthermore,
[w]here the contract is personal in nature and the contractual duty or obligation is so
coupled with matters of mental concern or solicitude, or with the sensibilities of the party
to whom the duty is owed, that a breach of that duty will necessarily or reasonably result
in mental anguish or suffering, and it should be known to the parties from the nature of
the contract that such suffering will result from its breach, compensatory damages therefor

may be recovered.
Id. at 813; see also Meyer v. Nottger, 241 N.W.2d 911,921 (Iowa 1976) (stating that "[w]here one holds
himself out as specially qualified to perform the services incident to a funeral and burial, unless there
is express contrary agreement, it is implied in a contract for such services that such person will exercise
proper skill and perform the contract in a workmanlike manner.").
217. Lamm, 55 S.E.2d at 813-14; see also Pat H. Foley & Co. v. Wyatt, 442 S.W.2d 904,905 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1969) (mother sued funeral home for mental suffering brought on when the casket of her son
was opened near the conclusion of the funeral service and the body emitted a grossly offensive odor,
indicating that the body may not have been properly embalmed; the defendant failed to advise the mother
against opening the casket at the funeral service).
218. Hirst v. Elgin Metal Casket Co., 438 F. Supp. 906, 908 (D. Mont. 1977). In that case, the court
stated that "[a] casket manufacturer who sells as leakproof a casket that leaks has failed to meet the very
need that formed the incentive to buy." Id.
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a verdict of $500,000 in compensatory damages to a woman whose husband was
not properly embalmed as he had requested in a pre-need burial contract.21 The
trial court granted a defense motion for a new trial limited to the issue of damages,
and in the second trial the jury returned a verdict of $100,000. " The judgments
are especially significant given that New Mexico does not recognize a cause of
action for
negligent infliction of emotional distress, except for bystander
liability~n '
While recovery might be had for actions that relate directly to the treatment of
the body contracted for, that liability might not extend to a matter such as late
delivery of a funeral marker. In a case from Maine, the court denied recovery to a
woman who claimed emotional distress damages from the failure of a company to
deliver her son's grave marker in time for her son's memorial service.m Although
she claimed that damages for late delivery of the memorial stone were "reasonably
within the contemplation of the contracting parties when the agreement was made,"
the court found that the exception allowing special damages for breach of contract
was not as broad as the mother claimed.' The court stated that "[i]t would strain
the exception for disposition of bodies and delivery of death messages to include
untimely delivery of a memorial stone."' The court's decision illustrates that
special damages for breaching a contract for funeral services must be directly
related to how the body is handled.
4. Federal Trade Commission Laws
A funeral home director may also violate Federal Trade Commission (FTC) rules
that regulate the funeral industry. 5 Until recently, the cost of a funeral generally
depended on the price of the casket.' The casket price would include not only

219. See Flores v. Baca, 871 P.2d 962, 964 (N.M. 1994).
220. See id. "Burial cases furnish the most obvious example of cases in which the contract for
decent treatment of a body seems to guarantee not merely a price but proper respect for feelings of
survivors, so that emotional distress damages would seem to be recoverable .... " Id. at 967.
221. See id at 966.
Contracts for funeral and burial services are imbued by the very nature of their subject
with certain expectations to be implied in fact unless specifically disclaimed. It is to be

expected that damages for cognizable harm to the ordinary emotional sensibilities of any
family member, in general, and known emotional sensibilities, in particular, will be
recoverable for a breach of the funeral provider's obligation to exercise reasonable skill
and care.
Id. at 967.
222. See Rubin v. Matthews Int'l Corp., 503 A.2d 694, 695 (Me. 1986).
223. Id. at 696.
224. Id. at 696-97. The court noted that "[m]ost of the actions in this area of the law, whether
sounding in contract or in tort, involve mishandling of the corpse, incidents occurring prior to or at
burial, or wrongful disinterments." Id. at 697. Given that those other cases directly involved the body
itself rather than just the grave marker, the court stated that it was "not persuaded.. . that the general
rule precluding damages for emotional or mental distress for breach of contract should be abandoned."
Id. at 698.
225. See 16 C.F.R. § 453 (2000).
226. See California Public Interest Research Group (CALPIRG), Can You Afford to Die?: A
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the cost of the casket, but also the cost of other basic necessities of a funeral
service, including transportation of the deceased and embalming of the body. 7
With a pricing system that included so many extra costs, consumers found that they
could purchase coffins from independent dealers at much lower prices.
In 1984, a rule adopted by the FTC required funeral directors to permit
consumers to use these less expensive coffins, although the directors could charge
an extra fee to cover the costs that would have otherwise been included.' While
this lowered the cost of many funerals, in some cases there was no difference in the
overall price because the funeral homes that allowed consumers to use outside
caskets were charging additional fees for doing so.
In 1994, in an effort to protect consumers from these fees, the FTC amended the
Funeral Home Rule to ban the additional fee for using outside caskets.' The
overall cost to consumers reportedly rose, however, as funeral directors were
allowed to charge a non-declinable fee to cover overhead costs.' In 1999, the
FTC requested comments on further amendments to the Funeral Home Rule, as part
of its systematic review of all current rules and regulations." Those comments
are currently under administrative review.
Because funeral homes must now provide an itemized list of expenses for the
services performed, a consumer may be able to identify suspect fees that may
be charged for the funerals of persons who die of AIDS-related causes. These
charges may be labeled as a "contagious disease fee" or a "special handling fee."
Funeral directors have attempted to justify these fees as covering the expenses of
the gloves, gowns, and disinfectants used as part of the universal precautions
mandated by OSHA and the CDC. However, because universal precautions must
be used universally, there should be no additional fees for cases where a person died
of AIDS-related causes. A funeral home that expressly lists additional fees for
handling a funeral of a person who died of AIDS-related causes may violate the
ADA and any applicable state statutes or local ordinances. 3 Conversely, a funeral
home that attempts to disguise additional fees for handling a funeral of a person
who died of AIDS-related causes may be failing to furnish accurate price
information as required by the Funeral Industry Practices rule,' in addition to
possible violations of the ADA and any applicable state statutes or local ordinances.

CALPIRG Report on the Prices, Practices, and Oversight of the Funeral Industry (last modified Feb. 18,

1998) <http:llwww.pirg.orglcalpirg/consumer/funeml> [hereinafter CALPIRG Report].

227. See id.
228. See 16 C.F.R. § 453; see also CALPIRG Report, supra note 226.
229. See 16 C.F.R. § 453; see also CALPIRG Report, supra note 226.
230. See CALPIRG Report, supra note 226.

231. See Comment Request, 64 Fed. Reg. 24,250 (1999), comment period extended, 64 Fed. Reg.

35,965 (1999).
232. See 16 C.F.R. § 453.2 (2000).
233. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 7685.1(c) (West 1995).

234. See 16 C.F.R. § 453.2.
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5.ConsumerFraud and Deceptive Business PracticesAct
Acts of discrimination may also fall under state statutes such as the Illinois

Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act.2" The Act may be
enforced by the State Attorney General or by a private cause of action.' To
prove liability under the Act, the plaintiff must show:
(a) a deceptive act or practice by the defendant;
(b) the defendant's intent that the plaintiff rely on the deception; and
(c) that the
deception occurred during a course of conduct involving trade or
37
commerce.2
Courts have liberally construed this Act to effectuate the legislature's intent to

provide broader protection than that given under common law fraud."' The Act
may be particularly useful in combating discrimination by funeral homes, given that
plaintiffs invoking the Act do not need to prove that anyone "has in fact been
misled, deceived or damaged thereby."" 9 While a plaintiff must still prove that

"the defendant's consumer fraud proximately caused [the] injuries,"'
necessary to satisfy the "but for" standard of causation.

it is not

In the context of a funeral for a person who died of AIDS-related causes, a

number of statements may give rise to a cause of action under the Consumer Fraud
and Deceptive Business Practice Act. In one case brought against a funeral home

director in Schaumburg, Illinois, the director was alleged to have made false
statements that a person who died from AIDS-related causes could not be removed

from the hospital for twenty-four to forty-eight hours after death, that the person
would have to be embalmed even for a closed-casket ceremony, and that there were

235. 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 505/2 (West 1993). The Act describes an unlawful practice as
follows:
Unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices, including but not
limited to the use or employment of any deception, fraud, false pretense, false promise,
misrepresentation or the concealment, suppression or omission of any material fact, with
intent that others rely upon the concealment, suppression or omission of such material
fact.., in the conduct of any trade or commerce are hereby declared unlawful whether
any person has in fact been misled, deceived or damaged thereby.
Id.
236. When brought as a private cause of action, the Act allows for attorney's fees. 815 ILL COMP.
STAT. 505/2AA(M) (West 1993); see also Sandra Swift Parrino & A. Kent Waldrep, Minus Tough
Penalty ADA Law is Toothless, WALL ST. J., June 14, 2000, at A27 (letter noting that the purpose of
attorneys' fees for actions under the federal disability law is that "without legal representation, most
disabled persons would not be able to enforce the law."). For a sample complaint including a cause of
action under the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, see MARK E.WOJCIK,
INmRODUCnON TO LEGAL ENGLISH 223-24 (International Law Inst. 1998).
237. See 815 ILL. COMp. STAT. ANN. 505/2; see also, e.g., Oliveira v. Amoco Oil. Co., 726 N.E.2d
51, 57 (il. App. Ct. 2000).
238. See Oliveira, 726 N.E.2d at 57.
239. 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 505/2; see also, e.g., Oliveira, 726 N.E.2d at 57. As noted in
Oliveira, the Illinois Supreme Court stated that "no actual reliance is required to state a cause of action
under the Act." Id.
240. Oliveira, 726 N.E.2d at 57.
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"heightened risks" in holding a wake for a person who died of AIDS-related
causes.!" The funeral home director making those misrepresentations convinced
the life partner of a man who died of AIDS-related causes to forgo a wake and
service at the funeral home in favor of a "quick service" at the cemetery. The
funeral director used his position to misrepresent the legal requirements of a burial
for a person who died of AIDS-related causes, and effectively denied to the
surviving partner any chance to cope with the loss.
6. Criminal Law
"The proper method for disposal of the dead has been regulated by law from
earliest times, on the continent of Europe by the canon law, and in England by the
ecclesiastical law."' 2 That regulation has sometimes included various provisions
under the criminal law. Prosecutions for mistreatment of a body have a long history
in the United States. In 1821, for example, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine
stated:
. From our childhood we all have been accustomed to pay a reverential
respect to the sepulchres of our fathers, and to attach a character of
sacredness to the grounds dedicated and inclosed as the cemeteries of
the dead. Hence, before the late statute of Massachusetts was enacted,
it was an offence at common law to dig up the bodies of those who had
been buried, for the purpose of dissection. It is an outrage upon the
public feelings, and torturing to the afflicted relatives of the deceased.
If it be a crime thus to disturb the ashes of the dead, it must also be a
crime to deprive them of a decent burial, by a disgraceful exposure, or
disposal of the body contrary to usages so long sanctioned, and which
are so grateful to the wounded hearts of friends and mourners. If a dead
body may be thrown into a river it may be cast into a street: - if the
body of a child - so, the body of an adult, male or female. Good
morals - decency - our best feelings - the law of the land - all
forbid such proceedings. It is imprudent to weaken the influence of that
sentiment which gives solemnity and interest to everything connected
with the tomb.
Our funeral rites and services are adapted to make deep impressions
and to produce the best effects. The disposition to perform with all
possible solemnity the funeral obsequies of the departed is universal in
our country; - and even on the ocean, where the usual method of
sepulture is out of the question, the occasion is marked with all the
respect which circumstances will admit. Our legislature, also, has made
it an offence in a civil officer to arrest a dead body by any process in

241. See Charge of Discrimination, John Doe v. Michael's Funeral Home, No. 1994CP3153 (IUI.
Dep't of Human Rights, June 20, 1994) (copy on file with the Oklahoma Law Review)
242. State v. Bradbury, 9 A.2d 657, 658 (Me. 1939).
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it is an affront to a virtuous

Although it may be difficult to imagine the criminal prosecution of a funeral
director for discriminatory acts against a person who died of causes related to HIV,
some criminal statutes may apply even to funeral directors or others who work in
the funeral home industry.' Two statutes examined here are for (a) "abuse of a
corpse"; and (b) disorderly conduct, a misdemeanor that may be the basis of a hate
crime based on disability.
a) Abuse of a Corpse
The Model Penal Code provides that unless authorized by law, "a person who
treats a corpse in a way that he knows would outrage ordinary family sensibilities
commits a misdemeanor."' The prohibition against conduct that would "outrage
ordinary family sensibilities" is
sufficiently broad to preclude gaps in coverage and yet sufficiently
precise in its statement of the ultimate question to provide a meaningful
standard of decision. Any possible problems of indeterminacy and lack
of notice to the actor are resolved by the requirement of knowledge with
respect to the outrageous character of his conduct. Thus, the person
who is not aware that his acts would offend family sensibilities does not
commit an offense under this section, even though precisely that
reaction obtains. Of course, the actor's idiosyncratic view of what is
outrageous does not matter. The standard is objective; it does not vary
either to exculpate on the basis of the actor's unusual callousness or to
condemn for outraging an excessively delicate relative of the
deceased.2'
A number of states have adopted this provision of the Model Penal Code or have
adopted a similar provision in their state criminal codes. A Colorado statute, for
example, provides that:
(1) A person commits abuse of a corpse if, without lawful authority,
he:

243. Kanavan's Case, I Me. 226, 227 (Me. 1821) (emphasis added) (providing an eight-month
sentence for the secret disposal of the body of a child born out of wedlock).
244. See Jocelyn Y. Stewart, Officials Fail to Quell Anger at Conditions in Cemetery, L.A. TIMS,
June 11, 2000, at B I (quoting Deputy District Attorney Ralph Plumer as saying, "Ifthere's a crime, we're
going to prosecute," in a case where investigators found pieces of bones and fragments of caskets

scattered around the grounds of the Woodlawn Cemetery in Compton, California).
245. MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.10 (1980).
246. Id. § 250.10 cmt.2; see also Dougan v. State, 912 S.W.2d 400, 403-04 (Ark. 1995); John S.
Herbrand, Annotation, Validity, Construction,and Application of Statutes Making it a Criminal Offense
to Mistreat or Wrongfully Dispose of Dead Body, 81 A.L.R.3D 1071 (1977).

HeinOnline -- 53 Okla. L. Rev. 426 2000

20001

DISCRIMINATION AFTER DEATH

(a) Removes the body or remains of any person from a grave or other
place of sepulcher without the consent of the surviving relatives or
surviving intimate friends; or
(b) Treats the body or remains of any person in a way that would
outrage normal family sensibilities. 47
Paragraph (a) allows either "surviving relatives" or the "surviving intimate
friends" to consent to the removal of a body from its final resting place. While
episodes of grave robbery or disinterment are unusual, there have been prosecutions
for violating this provision and ones similar to it. Paragraph (b) may be more likely
to arise in the context of a person who has died of AIDS-related causes. A funeral
home director who mistreats the body of a person who has died of AIDS-related
causes may be found guilty under this statute, if the treatment of the body would
"loutrage" normal sensibilities.
Other states that have adopted this provision of the Model Penal Code or a
provision similar to it include Alabama,' Arkansas,"9 Delaware,' Hawaii,"'
Kentucky,"2 Ohio,' Pennsylvania,' and TennesseeY5 While the crime is

a misdemeanor in most jurisdictions, some states such as Oregon regard it as a
felony.'

New Hampshire does not follow the Model Penal Code but makes it a misdemeanor if a person "unlawfully removes, conceals or destroys a corpse or any part
thereof."'
Other states, such as Maine and Texasars define the crime more
specifically. Maine describes the crime of "abuse of corpse" as occurring when a

person "intentionally and unlawfully disinters, digs up, removes, conceals, mutilates

247. COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 18-13-101(1) (West 1999). In Colorado, violation of the statute is
a class 2 misdemeanor. See id. § 18-13-101(2).
248. See ALA. CODE § 13A-11-13 (1994).
249. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-60-101 (Michie 1997); Dougan v. State, 912 S.W.2d 400, 403-04
(Ark. 1995).
250. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. I1 § 1332 (1995).
251. See HAW. REv. STAT. § 711-1108 (Lexis 1993).
252. See Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 525.120 (Banks-Baldwin 1997).
253. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2927.01 (Anderson 1996).
254. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5510 (West 1983); Commonwealth v. Smith, 567 A.2d 1070,
1072-73 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989). This section of the Pennsylvania statute survived a constitutional
challenge for vagueness, because "it is susceptible of a reasonable construction and provides sufficient
warning to a man of ordinary intelligence as to what is forbidden." Commonwealth v. Browne, 74 Pa.
D. & C.2d 724 (1976).
255. See TENN. CODE ANN. 39-17-312 (1997) (defining the crime as mistreating a corpse "in a
manner offensive to the sensibilities of an ordinary person").
256. See ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 166.085, 166.087 (1999).
257. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 644:7 (1996)
258. Texas defines "Abuse of Corpse" when a person "intentionally or knowingly: (I) disinters,
disturbs, removes, dissects, in whole or in part, carries away, or treats in a seriously offensive manner
a human corpse; (2) conceals a human corpse knowing it to be illegally disinterred; (3) sells or buys a
human corpse or in any way traffics in a human corpse; or (4) transmits or conveys, or procures to be
transmitted or conveyed, a human corpse to a place outside the state." TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.08
(West 1994).
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or destroys a human corpse, or any part or the ashes thereof."" The Maine statute
does not apply to "a physician, scientist or student who had in his possession, or
used human bodies or parts thereof lawfully obtained, for anatomical, physiological
or other scientific investigation or instruction."'
Still other states do not have particular statutes on "abuse of a body" as such, but
may punish other behavior, such as attempts to have sex with a corpse." Indiana
law also punishes a person who "mutilates" a corpse or opens a casket intending to
do so," but that law includes an express exception for a funeral director,
embalmer, or an employee of a funeral home director or embalmer who is "engaged
in the individual's normal scope of practice and employment."2 "
Where there is no express exception, a funeral home director might raise three
possible defenses to such a prosecution. First, the funeral home director would
certainly claim a statutory defense of having "lawful authority" to handle the body.
While the director would be authorized to handle the corpse of the decedent, the
director would not have legal authority to treat it with disrespect or reckless
negligence.
Second, a funeral home director may claim that the standard of liability in
determining "normal family sensibilities" is too vague. This argument has been
raised unsuccessfully in some jurisdictions. For example, an Ohio statute makes it
a misdemeanor to treat a human corpse in a way that the person knows would
outrage "reasonable family sensibilities."' Another provision of the same Ohio
statute makes it a felony to treat a human corpse in a way that would outrage
"reasonable community sensibilities."' In rejecting a constitutional challenge to
the broader language, an Ohio court determined that its state statute prohibiting
unauthorized persons from treating human corpses in a manner that would outrage
"reasonable community sensibilities" was not unconstitutionally vague and does not
violate due process.' While the Ohio decision is not binding on other jurisdictions, it does offer some indication that other jurisdictions would be unlikely to find
similar provisions void for vagueness.
b) Hate Crime Statute
Where a person died of AIDS-related causes, a funeral home director might
discriminate in more active ways than overcharging or refusing certain services. If
the acts taken are especially extreme or outrageous, a funeral home director might

259. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A § 508(1) (West 1983)
260. Id. § 508(2).
261. See IOWA CODE § 709.18 (West Supp. 2000); see also Workman v. State, 716 N.E.2d 445
(Ind. 1999) (concluding that the abuse of a corpse was an aggravator for imposing an enhanced sentence
for murder).
262. See IND. CODE ANN. § 35-45-11-2 (Michie 1998).
263. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-45-11-1 (Michie 1998).
264. OHIO Ray. CODE ANN. § 2927.01(A) (Anderson 1996).
265. See id § 2927.01(B).
266. See State v. Hopfer, 679 N.E.2d 321,344 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996); State v. Gardner, 582 N,E2d
1014, 1016-17 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989); State v. Glover, 479 N.E.2d 901, 904 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984).
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even be charged with "disorderly conduct," a misdemeanor that can sometimes be
elevated to a felony by virtue of state hate crime statutes. Although there have been
no reported criminal prosecutions of funeral home directors for such extreme acts
of discrimination, given the emotional and sometimes highly charged nature of
funerals, an appropriate future case may arise to charge a funeral home director or
employee under a hate crime statute. In the United States there are more than forty
states with some form of hate crime legislation, 7 with attempts to introduce
legislation in the remaining states' and on the federal level.'
The Illinois Hate Crime Statute, to take one state example, provides in part:
A person commits hate crime when, by reason of the actual or
perceived race, color, creed, religion, ancestry, gender, sexual orientation, physical or mental disability, or national origin of another
individual or group of individuals, he [or she] commits assault, battery,
aggravated assault, misdemeanor theft, criminal trespass to residence,
misdemeanor criminal damage to property, criminal trespass to vehicle,
criminal trespass to real property, mob action or disorderly conduct .... .
A "physical disability" under this Illinois statute would include HIV infection and
27
For a criminal
AIDS, whether that disability is "actual" or only "perceived.""
conviction of hate crime under this statute, the prosecutor must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed a predicate offense "by reason of"
the actual or perceived membership in a protected classification.' The Illinois
statute does not require that bias be the sole reason for the predicate offense,
because the statute is primarily "intended to be directed towards the biased
motivation of the perpetrator."' Thus, prosecution may be appropriate when the
defendant's acts are even only partially motivated by prohibited bias. As other states
have noted, "[tlhe deprivation of civil rights . . . does not have to be the
predominant purpose of the defendant's acts."'
267. See Editorial, Attacking Hate Crimes, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2000, at A30.
268. See, e.g., id. (urging New York to enact a state hate-crime statute, stating that "lt has been
a source of shame that year after year New York State has failed to enact a meaningful hate-crime law

even as violence against gays and minority groups has become more common."); Lisa Neff, N.Y. Senate
Approves Hate CrimesBill, CHICAGO FREE PRESS, June 14,2000, at 20; Tony Peregrin, Landmark N.Y.
Bias Crime Bill Clears a Key Hurdle, WINDY CITY TIMES, June 15, 2000, at I (both stories reporting
that the New York State Senate passed a hate crimes prevention law that had been passed in the New
York State Assembly every year for the previous ten years).
269. See, e.g., Adam Clymer, Senate ErpandsHate Crimes Bill to Include Gays, N.Y. TIMES, June
21, 2000, at Al; Adam Clymer, FederalLaw on Hate Crime Is Scheduledfor a Vote in the Senate, N.Y.

TIMEs, June 20,2000, at A17; see also Mark Flanigan, Coming Out of Hatred,ADVOCATE, July 4,2000,
at 9 (former neo-Nazi who is now urging that "Americans of all races, religions, and sexual orientations
must work together to ensure the passage of the Hate Crimes Prevention Act").
270. 720 ILL. CoMP. STAT. ANN. A5/12-7.1(a) (West Supp. 2000).
271. See id.
272. See id
273. In re B.C., 680 N.E.2d 1355, 1360 (Ill. 1997).
274. See JACK O'MALLEY, COOK CO. STATE'S ATrORNEY'S OFFICE, A PROSECUTOR'S GUIDE TO

HeinOnline -- 53 Okla. L. Rev. 429 2000

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:389

A hate crime is often difficult to prosecute successfully. For example, the use of
only one explicit reference to a protected classification may not provide much
indication that a particular offensive act was motivated by bias."s Some facts,
however, may help establish liability. For example, if a funeral home director
refuses to allow visitors to attend the funeral of a person who died of AIDS-related
causes because he believes that the visitors are also infected with HIV, the director
may do so in a way that could rise to the level of "disorderly conduct." That
misdemeanor may be one of the predicate offenses for statutory hate crime. Illinois
defines "disorderly conduct" to occur when a person knowingly "[d]oes any act in
such unreasonable manner as to alarm or disturb another and to provoke a breach
of the peace . . "' If a funeral director became belligerent toward the family
and friends of the deceased to such an extreme degree as to warrant a charge of
disorderly conduct, it would be possible to charge the funeral director with a hate
crime based on the fact that his bias is motivated by the perceived or physical
disability of the deceased.
In addition to a possible criminal prosecution, state statutes may permit a civil
cause of action for hate crime. For example, the Illinois hate crime statute provides:
Independent of any criminal prosecution or the result thereof, any
person suffering injury to his person or damage to his property as a
result of hate crime may bring a civil action for damages, injunction or
other appropriate relief. The court may award actual damages, including
damages for emotional distress, or punitive damages. A judgment may
include attorney's fees and costs.'
It may be easier for a plaintiff to prevail in a civil action under the hate crime
statute, as the defendant will not be entitled to a presumption of innocence and the
plaintiff must prove the allegations only by a preponderance of the evidence.
Z Licensing Laws
Funeral directors and embalmers "are usually licensed by a state authority, and
complaints of inflated prices or of denials of service based on HIV infection should
27
In Illinois, for example, a
be reported to the proper [state] authorities.""
complaint against a funeral home director or an embalmer can be made to the

HATE CRIME VI-5, 6 (1994) (citing Commonwealth v. Stephens, 515 N.E.2d 606, 610-11 (Mass. App.
Ct. 1987)) (emphasis added). In Stephens, the court affirmed a conviction where a defendant's conduct

was in part motivated by retaliation against the victim for having thrown a marble earlier in the day; the
court held that the jury could reasonably find that the defendant was also acting out of hatred for
Cambodians. Compare also, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, The Justices Make It Easierto Win Suits for Job
Bias, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2000, at A21.

275. See People v. Davis, 674 N.E.2d 895, 897-98 (I11.App. Ct. 1996) (white defendant attacked
a black man outside of a bar, the defendant used explicit reference to racial animus, but the court stated
that although there was no doubt a battery was perpetrated, "whether [defendant] did so 'by reason of
[victim's]
276.
277.
278.

race is less clear.'").
720 ILL. CoMP. STAT. ANN. 5/26-1(a)(1) (West 1993).
720 ILL COMP. STAT. 5/12-7.1(e) (West 2000).
Barnes, supra note 93, at 11-17.
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Illinois Department of Professional Regulation, which allows members of the public
to file complaints by electronic mail through its website.2'
The remedy of pursuing a professional complaint has several advantages,
provided it is done in good faith and not threatened in order to gain an unfair
advantage in civil litigation. First, the funeral home director is likely to act quickly
and professionally when there is a danger of losing a professional license. Second,
the administrative proceedings are done without cost to the individual, so there is
no financial hurdle to pursuing a complaint against an unscrupulous funeral home
director. Third, the departments enforcing the professional regulations have no
agenda other than to protect the public and encourage professional behavior.
8. Wills
The status of dead bodies has been said to be generally well defined in the
law."0 At common law there was no "property right" in a dead body and the body
was not part of the decedent's estate."' Although a body is not "property" that can
pass under a will, courts have nevertheless enforced the clearly expressed wishes
of testators as to the dispositions of their bodies - even over objections from
family members and personal representatives of the estates. In one case from
Florida, for example, a man who died in 1997 included an express request in his
will that he should be cremated and have his ashes strewn by his wife.'
Unfortunately, the man's wife died three months before he died, and the personal
representatives objected to the cremation for reasons of conscience."' The probate
court ordered the man to be cremated according to his will.' The Florida District
Court of Appeals affirmed that holding and stated that "Florida courts have long
held that testamentary directions are to be complied with to the fullest extent
possible."' Indeed, "[t]here is no higher duty nor greater responsibility on the
courts than that of seeing to it, in proper cases, that the will of the dead is
honored.""6
Courts have noted when a will fails to expressly designate a method of disposing
of a body or fails to delegate that power to the executor. 7 Attorneys preparing
wills for clients with HIV may thus want to include express provisions as to final
disposition of the body, even though the body technically does not pass under the
will. Including an express provision in the will may increase the likelihood that the

279. See Illinois Department of Professional Regulation (visited Oct. 31, 2000)
<hup://www.dpr.state.il.usl>.
280. See, e.g., Philippe Ducor, The Legal Status of Human Materials,44 DRAKE L. REV. 195,212

(1996).
App. Ct. 1997).
281. See, e.g., In re Estate of Medlen, 677 N.E.2d 33, 35 (111.
282. See Kasmer v. Guardianship of Limner, 697 So. 2d 220, 220 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
283. See id.

284. See id. at 220-21.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 221 (quoting Morgenthaler v. First Atlantic Nat'! Bank of Daytona Beach, 697 So. 2d
446, 452 (Fla. 1955).
287. See, e.g., Stewart v. Schwartz Brothers-Jeffer Memorial Chapel, Inc., 606 N.Y.S.2d 965, 966
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1993).
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funeral services and disposition of the body will comply with the wishes of the
testator.
9. Power of Attorney for Health Care
While there is no property right in a body, the "next of kin" have been said to
have a "personal"' right or "quasi-property"' right in a body, which arises

from their duty to bury the dead. This quasi-property right has been construed to
confer upon the next of kin the right to determine the time, manner, and place of

burial.'

In some states, however, the durable power of attorney for health care

will survive the principal's deathand empower the named agent to make necessary

funeral arrangements (unless the principal specifically excludes the agent from that
power when filling out the durable power of attorney)."' The named agent may

thus have the legal right to make funeral arrangements in jurisdictions where the
health care power of attorney survives the death. In a dispute with estranged family

members, the named agent would have the right to decide upon the disposition of
the body.

This is only true, however, in jurisdictions where the health care

power of attorney survives the death of the principal. In many jurisdictions the
durable powers of attorney time of death.'

for both health care and for property

-

cease at the

288. E.g., Stewart,606 N.Y.S.2d at 967 ("[A]s there is merely a personal and not a proprietary right
in the decedent's body, it is not subject to delegation under the will and, therefore, not within the
executors control.").
289. E.g., Pyle v. Pyle, 531 S.E.2d 738, 740 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000); In re Estate of Medlen, 677
N.E.2d 33, 35-36 (I11.App. Ct. 1997).
App. Ct. 1997); Stewart, 606 N.Y.S.2d at
290. See In re Estate of Medlen, 677 N.E.2d 33, 36 (111.
967.
291. See, e.g., 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/2-1 (West 1993) (stating "that each individual has the right
to appoint an agent to deal with property or make personal and health care decisions for the individual").
292. The members of the traditional family may, however, have the money needed for appropriate
burial services. Funeral home directors are often called upon to mediate disputes in these circumstances
where a person with the legal right to make the arrangements lacks the money to do so. Compromises
are common, yet funeral home directors are seldom trained to mediate these disputes effectively.
293. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3410 (1995) (providing that the health care power of an
attorney expires at death). As one funeral director in Silver Spring, Maryland, explained:
A lot of people don't realize their durable powers of attorney cease at time of death, says
Paul Lee. A lot of attorneys don't know that. And technically, that means the lover can't
sign a required authorization to cremate. Only the next of kin is authorized to sign it. And
a lot of times, as soon as someone dies, you'll see a complete 180-degree turn in some
family attitudes. That happens quite a bit.
That 'turn' in the family's attitude, he explains, is often a hostile one, against the
surviving lover. Even if there is no family, there can be additional problems for Gays.
If there's no next of kin, says Lee, the medical examiner won't let us pick up the body
for as much as 30 days. That, of course, delays any ceremonies for burial or cremation
and prolongs the grieving of the lost person's lover and friends.
CLOSEN Er AL. AIDS CASES & MATERIALS, supra note 139, at 70-71 (Supp. 1992) (summary of Lisa

M. Keen, Preparingfor the Final Goodbye, WASHINGTON BLADE, Apr. 10, 1992, at 1).
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IV. Conclusion
This article reaches five primary conclusions. First, because it is unlawful to
discriminate against persons with HIV, and because funeral services are places of
public accommodation, it is unlawful to refuse to handle the body of a person who
dies of an illness related to HIV. Funeral homes that charge more to handle a
person who died of HIV violate the human rights laws and, in some jurisdictions,
specific statutes make it illegal to charge more to embalm the remains of a person
with a communicable disease.
Second, as the number of deaths related to HIV continues to increase, funeral
homes must educate their employees as to proper infection control procedures and
must ensure that appropriate protective measures are available to comply with the
universal precautions. It should not be a future defense to a charge of discrimination
that the funeral home simply did not know how to handle a person who died of an
illness related to HV. Neither should it be a defense that other funeral homes may
be better suited, or have more experience, in providing services to persons who die
of illnesses related to HIV.
Third, the appropriate protective gear should be made available to all embalmers
called to work at the funeral home, whether or not the funeral home considers the
embalmer to be an independent contractor. If the funeral home provides the work
space and work materials for an embalmer working as an independent contractor,
the funeral home may still face lawsuits for failing to provide appropriate materials.
Fourth, it is discriminatory to suggest to families that a person who died of an
illness related to HIV must be cremated or that the memorial service must be held
with a closed casket by reason of decedent's cause of death. Thousands of funerals
across the country (and in other countries) have proven that the full range of options
should be offered to the families.
Fifth, it is discriminatory to charge more simply because a person died of an
illness related to HIV. The universal precautions should not be used only when a
funeral home director knows (or suspects) that a person died of an illness related
to HIV. Funeral home directors must provide a full range of services to persons
who die of illnesses related to HIV. They must unilaterally implement the universal
precautions to safeguard themselves and their employees in all instances. And they
cannot discriminate in the services offered or the fees charged when a person dies
of an illness related to HIV.
Conclusions can also be drawn about family members and loved ones who
survive the death of a person with AIDS. Survivors will often passively accept the
For the surdiscrimination against themselves and against their loved ones.
vivors, the need for a quiet period of grief and mourning far outweighs the need to
assert legal rights or to protest against any acts of perceived or actual
discrimination"s It is also often the case that because few survivors have

294. See Wojcik &Austin, supra note 2,at 78.
295. See id.
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experience in arranging a funeral, they may not even realize that they or their loved
ones are the victims of discrimination. In the case of overcharging, for example,

a person may not recognize that an extra charge is illegal or that charges for
services or materials provided are higher than they would be if the cause of death

was not related to AIDS.

Yet even when people are aware of discrimination,

they may not see the larger social benefit of pursuing cases that may alleviate future

discrimination for others.m

They may also decide that the emotional and

psychological drain of having to participate in litigation against a funeral home is

simply too great, because the litigation process of depositions and in-court testimony
will force them to relive not only the experiences of that funeral, but the thought
that they "could have done more" to recognize and protest the acts of discrimination
as they were happening.
Given the understandable hesitancy of survivors and personal representatives to

litigate cases of funeral home discrimination - as well as the reluctance of private
attorneys to undertake complex cases that may appear to lack the potentially large

judgments of other types of civil rights or torts litigation - the most effective
solution to the problem of funeral home discrimination may lie not in actually
litigating these cases but in educating funeral home professionals, mortuary students,

and health care advocates about what the legal requirements are.' The laws must
also be enforced, however, lest the educational message ring hollow for lack of

effective enforcement or penalty for acts of discrimination. An appropriate
educational model will also do much to combat funeral home discrimination in other

296. See id.
297. See iL
298. See id.
299. Many jurisdictions already require continuing education seminars as a condition of licensing,
so the concept of attending a special seminar on a topic such as "AIDS Law for Funeral Directors" would
not be a foreign concept to the funeral industry itself. Indeed, as the topic has not been frequently
discussed in existing continuing education seminars, many funeral directors would welcome the
opportunity to learn about the legal (and medical) aspects of AIDS. A "syllabus" for these seminars
could include the following elements:
(1) General medical aspects of HIV and HIV transmission, including specific aspects about the
survival of HIV after the host has died;
(2) Review of "universal precautions";
(3) Overview of the federal (and state or local) anti-discrimination laws, including information on how
those anti-discrimination laws have been applied to funeral homes; including enforcement measures taken
by the U.S. Department of Justice, other agencies, and private lawsuits;
(4) Information about related subjects such as sexual orientation and about measures to reduce
homophobia, which may affect the professional delivery of services to affected population groups, and
including information about how the funeral home director can negotiate, if necessary, between
competing demands of a traditional family and an alternative family, including an understanding of
alternative funeral arrangements;
(5) Explanations of the need and often legal right of non-traditional family members to make the
appropriate funeral arrangements;
(6) Review of social aspects of mourning and grief, including "bereavement overload" when countless
friends die of AIDS-related causes; and
(7) Encouraging only the highest professional behavior and courtesy from funeral service providers,
who should be models to guide societal responses to HIV and AIDS.

HeinOnline -- 53 Okla. L. Rev. 434 2000

2000]

DISCRIMINATION AFTER DEATH

countries. Education is superior to litigation in the long-term battle against
discrimination. Funeral home professionals behave professionally when they know
what is expected of them. Their professional behavior, in turn, sets an example for
others for how to handle persons with HIV with dignity and respect. When that
treatment is available to persons who fight discrimination3' while they are alive, they
will not "face that kind of discrimination at death, too. 00

300. Americans With Disabilities Act of 1989: Hearings on S. 933, supra note 1, at 103 (statement
of Betty and Emory Corey).
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